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randomized-controlled trial evaluating the potential for messaging-based nudges to
elicit increased real estate tax compliance in Philadelphia. Our primary conclusions
are that most proposed messaging strategies are indistinguishable from a plainly-
worded reminder bill (the exception being consequentialist letters threatening reper-
cussive action absent compliance), but that the saliency per se of a plainly-worded
vi
bill can induce late payers to remunerate more quickly.
vii
Contents
List of Tables x
List of Figures xii
1 Introduction 1
2 Teacher Turnover in Wisconsin 13
2.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Salary Scale Imputation with Constrained B-Splines . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.1 Goodness of Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Turnover in Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.1 Long-Distance Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4.2 Supply and Demand for Subject Specialists . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.3 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3 Active Learning Classrooms for College Calculus Instruction 69
3.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2 Study Setting and Instructional Contrast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Study Design and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.1 Noncompliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3.2 Predicting Switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.1 Covariate Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.2 Evaluation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4 Procrastination and Property Tax Compliance: Evidence from a
Field Experiment 111
4.1 Taxpayers As Procrastinators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2 A Field Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.3 Randomization Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
viii
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5 Conclusion 145
Appendices 151
A Appendix to Chapter 2: Longitudinal Teacher Panel from Unlinked
Cross-Sectional Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B Appendix to Chapter 4: Additional Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . 159
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
ix
List of Tables
2.1 Year-to-year Transitions of Teachers by Experience, 2000-10 . . . . . 38
2.2 Destination Community Type for Teachers Changing Districts, by Ori-
gin Community Type and Teacher Experience Level . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3 Average Change in Salary and District Student Characteristics (and
Standard Deviations) for Teachers Changing Districts, by Gender and
Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Average Change in Salary and District Student Characteristics (and
Standard Deviations) for Teachers Changing to a District More than
50 Miles Away, by Gender and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Average Change in Salary and District Student Characteristics (and
Standard Deviations) for Teachers with Master’s Degrees Changing
Districts, by Subject Area and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6 Average Change in Salary and in District and Campus Student Char-
acteristics (and Standard Deviations) for Teachers with 1-10 Years of
Experience Who Change Districts, by Community Type of Origin and
Destination District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.7 Average Change in District and Campus Student Characteristics (and
Standard Deviations) for Black and Hispanic Teachers with 1-10 Years
of Experience who Change Campuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.8 School Average Transition Rates by Distribution of Residual Teacher Salary and Student Demo-
graphic Characteristics (data weighted by number of teachers in school) . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.9 Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on the
Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts, by Experience (linear probability models; Huber-
White standard errors in parentheses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.10 Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on the
Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts with District Fixed Effects, by Experience (linear
probability models; Huber-White standard errors in parentheses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.11 Estimated Effects of Relative Local Wage and Student Demographic
Characteristics on the Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts
with District Fixed Effects, by Experience (linear probability models;
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
x
2.12 Multinomial Logit Estimated Effects of Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics
on the Probabilities That Teachers Switch School Districts or Exit Teaching Relative to Remaining
in Same District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.1 Initial Assignment to Lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Transitions from Initial Assignment (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Using Observables to Anticipate Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Descriptive Statistics by Initial Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Outcome Data by Initial Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Average Effects of Treatment on the Treated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Average Effects of Treatment on the Treated (with Controls) . . . . . 93
3.8 Regression-Based Intent to Treat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.9 Regression-Based Intent to Treat (Unadjusted SEs) . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.10 Regression-Based Intent to Treat (Asymptotic SEs) . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.11 Regression-Based Intent to Treat (with Consistent Population) . . . . 100
3.12 Regression-Based Intent to Treat (Using Imputed Covariates) . . . . 101
3.13 First-Stage Regression for Local-Average Treatment Effects . . . . . . 104
3.14 Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.15 Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects (Cluster-Robust SEs)106
3.16 Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects (Consistent Popu-
lation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.17 Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects (Imputed Covariates)109
4.1 Balance on Observables (Single Property Owners) . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 Short-Term Linear Probability Model Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3 Short-term Results: Relative to Reminder-Only . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.4 Long-Term Linear Probability Model Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.5 Three Month Impact of Collection “Nudges”* . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
A1 Robustness Analysis: Relative to Reminder (All Owners) . . . . . . . 160
A2 Balance on Observables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
A3 Short-Term Logistic Model Estimates (Unary Owners) . . . . . . . . 162
A4 Logit Estimates Including Multiple Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
xi
List of Figures
2.1 Pay in Milwaukee, 2003-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Estimation Results for Milwaukee, 2003-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Estimation Results for Selected Sparse Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Comparison of True Contracted Schedule with Output of Imputation 36
2.5 Comparison of the Prevalence of Different Community Types . . . . . 43
2.6 How Much Do Teachers Stand to Gain from Changing Districts through-
out Their Careers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Framework for Assignment of Students to Traditional or Active Learn-
ing Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2 Diffusion of Students from Initial Assignment over Time . . . . . . . 83
3.3 Permutation Distribution of ITT by Time Slot . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.4 Permutation Distribution of Wald Estimator by Time Slot . . . . . . 103
A.1 Frequency of Matching by Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This work is dedicated to understanding and applying a wide range of topics in
public economics. In three chapters, I explore public elementary and high school
teachers’ revealed preferences for pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of compensa-
tion; the potential for novel technology-assisted pedagogical modes to strengthen the
STEM pipeline at American undergraduate institutions; and the efficacy of low-cost,
behaviorally-founded tools for local governments to recoup their debts quickly.
The first chapter is all about investigating the labor market for teachers and which
incentives can be targeted by policymakers to improve student outcomes. Good teach-
ers have large impacts on student achievement1. It is therefore imperative for public
schools to be able to attract and retain high-quality teachers. Of preeminent con-
cern for policymakers, then, is the strength of the various manipulable levers at their
1See, e.g., Rockoff ([2004]).
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disposal for influencing teacher labor markets. More specifically, state and local edu-
cation administrators would like to identify the policy implications of various tools on
three types of teacher mobility: intra-district switching, where due to the collectively
bargained nature of most teachers’ salaries, only nonpecuniary considerations matter,
inter-district switching, where teachers move to another school district in the same
state, and exo-district switching, where teachers leave the public teaching workforce
entirely2.
The brunt of this chapter is a replication in a new context (Wisconsin) and time
horizon (2000 - 2010) of Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin ([2004]), who analyze various
predictors of teacher churn. The headline results of Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin
([2004]) were that “teacher mobility is much more strongly related to characteristics
of the students, particularly race and achievement, than to salary, although salary
exerts a modest impact once compensating differentials are taken into account.” I
confirm the pith of this conclusion, namely that student characteristics are a much
better predictor of turnover than are wage differentials, though I come to different
conclusions regarding more specific points. To wit, while I do find strong evidence that
the socioeconomic makeup of a teacher’s district predicts turnover (and that there is
heterogeneity in this effect by teacher race), the evidence I find for the importance of
2Policies that affect the supply and quality of new teachers to the profession may also be of
considerable importance to replenishing and improving the stock of teachers over time, but I do not
consider these channels in this work. See Harris and Sass ([2011]), Wayne et al. ([2008]), and Boyd
et al. ([2009]).
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wages and student achievement is far from compelling.
I explore to the extent possible potential contributors to this discrepancy in results;
most salient are the measurable differences between Texas, where Hanushek, Kain,
and Rivkin ([2004]) conduct their study, and Wisconsin. Wisconsin is a largely rural
state – its largest city/metropolitan area, Milwaukee, currently has roughly 600,000
residents (1,500,000 including the metropolitan area), making it around the 30th-
largest city in the United States3. By contrast, Texas has six cities larger than this,
with El Paso (#6 in Texas) being the nearest in size to Milwaukee. Though the non-
urban parts of Texas are themselves sparsely populated and distinctly rural, the more
uniform lack of major population centers in Wisconsin is likely to be reflected when
considerably different preferences among local vis--vis urban residents for various
aspects of potential teaching positions are aggregated.
To the end of exploring the pecuniary aspects of teacher turnover, I start by ex-
panding upon the efforts of Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin ([2004]) to infer teachers’
tenure-wage paths from teacher-level data on pay. Most unionized teachers are paid
according to a salary schedule (specifying wages as an increasing function of tenure
and certification) explicated in contracts collectively bargained at the district level.
With this easily-obtained information in hand, teachers are able to infer their future
potential wage trajectories at their own and other potential district employers. Lack-
ing the physical contract faced by the teachers, an econometrician armed only with
3In fact, Milwaukee is the only city in Wisconsin considered to be “large” for NCES reporting
purposes.
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administrative data reporting actual wages in a given year must use some imputation
techniques to deduce the underlying wage structure. I explore the utility of natu-
ral Constrained B-Splines (COBS) to this end. COBS are an enhanced version of
the traditional semiparametric splines technique enhanced by the ability to impose
a monotonicity constraint on the resultant curve which allows the fit to incorporate
more local information from nearby experience cells.
The fidelity and utility of the resulting fitted contract curves are supreme. In both
large and small districts, COBS produces a plausible tenure-wage arc which enables
us to examine counterfactual wage levels for mobile teachers. By comparing the fit to
a small number of wage tables obtained from actual contracts, I also learn that using
COBS may be preferable to an attempt to use actual wage tables, as the data-derived
curves can reveal latent progress of teachers towards further certification, an aspect
which is commonly observed in salary tables but rarely included in teacher-level data.
The second Chapter continues to have improving student-teacher interactions as a
motivation, but proceeds to study an older segment of the education sector – college.
With the rise of technology in the classroom have come a variety of approaches to
teaching course material based on methods unavailable in the past due to absent
technological tools. While the literature formally aiming to identify causal effects
of these new methods on student outcomes is growing, there is still as yet no broad
conclusions about if, when, and how such new methods can be used to serve the needs
of students and/or simplify the process of learning for students and instructors alike.
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This chapter seeks to advance our understanding of factors that influence students’
engagement and learning in college mathematics. The particular focus of the study is a
comparison of traditional and active instructional methods (with online components)
in the context of an intermediate calculus course at a mid-sized private university in
the Northeast. In theory, the appeal of active learning classrooms is that students
taught in this mode will more fully engage with the curriculum and, as a result,
that they will attain deeper understanding and mastery of mathematical concepts,
thereafter proceeding to pursue degrees in math or the sciences
I test this hypothesis by block-randomizing students between the two pedagogical
modes and monitoring their performance in the course. I supplement the quanti-
tative measures of student progress with qualitative data obtained through formal
course observations designed to elicit an understanding of the differences in learning
environments and treatment fidelity among the six lecture sections.
Given substantial noncompliance observed in the data, I use the potential out-
comes framework of, e.g., Rubin ([1974]), G. W. Imbens and Rubin ([2015]) and
Angrist and Imbens ([1995]) to construct intent-to-treat (ITT) and local average
treatment effect (LATE) estimates of active learning environments on student per-
formance. I incorporate the blocked nature of randomization to our estimates by
block-bootstrapping standard errors for these estimates. I find suggestively negative
point estimates in two of the time slots, but no results are statistically significant.
The substantial noncompliance observed in the data is suggestive of several impor-
5
tant considerations for randomized trial design in similar settings. It is apparent that
instructor fixed effects can be substantial – in our setting, there was stark contrast
in the level of experience of the traditional vis-a-vis the active learning instructors
in precisely the two sections that attracted the most non-compliers (i.e., this level
of experience is also accompanied by renown among students). Absent randomizing
instructors to pedagogical modes or restricting the ability of students to change sec-
tions (both impossible, practically speaking), the solution to overcoming this threat
to identification is replication – namely, to continue to monitor the performance of
students in the two instructional modes. In the longer run, sample size increase and
balancing of fixed effects as instructors accustom to the new method and students gain
comfort with how to perform in such a class stand to strengthen our understanding
of the impacts of active learning for student achievement.
Our experience with treatment infidelity in the pilot round of our collaborative
study with the City of Philadelphia led us to design a more ambitious and tightly-
controlled second iteration of our real estate tax experiment, which is the topic of
Chapter 34. Property taxation is the primary tax for most U.S. cities. In fiscal
year 2013, 30 percent of all local government revenues and over 73 percent of local
taxes came from the property tax Barnett and Vidal [2013]. Yet collection of the tax
has, in many cities, been problematic. While some U.S. cities do an excellent job in
collecting the tax, receiving over 95 percent of assessed revenues in the year the tax is
4This chapter is a co-authored work, with Charles Loeffler, John MacDonald, Holger Sieg, and
Robert Inman
6
due, other cities have over the last ten years done significantly worse – notably Flint
(78%), Cleveland (84%), Pittsburgh (86%), Milwaukee (87%), Philadelphia (88%),
Detroit (89%), and St. Louis (89%).5 While Flint, Detroit, Cleveland and Milwaukee
are relatively poor cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh are not. Among the list of cities
with outstanding tax collection records are Buffalo, Birmingham, Houston, and New
Orleans. While city poverty is important, it cannot be the whole explanation for low
rates of collection. Poor tax administration is likely to be an important contributing
factor as well.
This failure to collect the property tax on time creates budget uncertainty at best
and budget deficits at worst. Yet collecting the property tax should be straightfor-
ward. In contrast to collecting self-reported taxes such as those on income, profits,
and sales, property tax obligations equal to the city’s assigned assessed value of the
taxed property times the city chosen tax rate are known by both the city and the
taxpayer. There is no uncertainty as to what is due, or when.6 Payment is primarily a
matter of enforcement. The most common enforcement strategy is the economic stick:
fines and penalties. Failure to pay property taxes in time leads to interest penalties
sufficiently large that there is no arbitrage advantage to waiting, and perhaps to a
significant late fine as well.
5For more details, see Chirico et al. [2016].
6Much of the current literature on tax compliance has focused on taxpayers truthful reporting of
income or sales under the threat of a tax audit; see Slemrod [2007] for a review and more recently
the research of Kleven et al. [2011] and Pomeranz [2015].
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When a delinquent taxpayer does not respond to penalties and fines, the city can
take out a tax lien on the property. A lien does not impose any immediate direct,
tangible costs on a taxpayer since payments are typically only realized at the time
of a transaction.7 However, obtaining a tax lien enables the owner of the lien to
eventually start a foreclosure process. When the owner of a property located in a city
fails to make a payment arrangement on municipal tax levied on his or her property,
that property may be sold at auction to allow the city to collect on that unpaid debt.
However, the foreclosure process is costly and time intensive.8 While there are some
problems with the effectiveness of the existing enforcement mechanisms, it is only
possible to avoid payment by abandoning the property in the long run. Needless to
say, this is a very costly option for most owners.
Despite the fact that there are no obvious financial gains to not paying property
taxes, we observe that a significant fraction of tax payers do not pay on time. To
explain the behavior of these procrastinators, researchers have started to explore
the effectiveness of softer, nudge approaches or notification strategies to reinforce the
different motivations of tax compliance. This chapter uses a field experiment involving
over 19,000 delinquent Philadelphia taxpayers to examine the effectiveness of seven
7A city can also sell tax liens to investors to speed up the revenue collection process. Liens often
sell at above par prices because of the foreclosure option. But selling liens to “vulture investors”
can be politically costly for a city administration.
8Auctions are administered in Philadelphia by the Office of the Sheriff. This process of offloading
a property at Sheriff’s Sale can take nine months to a year.
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alternative strategies for improving city property tax collection. Each involves a
randomly assigned tax “nudge” of a tardy taxpayer. The first is a simple reminder
that the payment is late. The next two involve the reminder plus a threat of a
significant sanction if payment is not received by the end of the calendar year: a lien
on the home when sold equal to taxes due plus accrued interest and penalties or the
lien coupled with an immediate sheriff’s sale of the home to collect the lien. The final
four nudges include the reminder coupled with an appeal to what the tax compliance
literature has called a “tax morale” motive for paying one’s taxes.9 The four morale
motives included here are: first, a reminder that taxes pay for neighborhood services
such as street repairs, trash pick-up and the local park; second, a reminder that taxes
pay for important city-wide services such as police protection and public schools;
third, a reminder that 9 out of 10 Philadelphians have paid their taxes and you have
not; and fourth, a reminder that paying one’s taxes is an important obligation of
citizenship in a democracy. Tax compliance after receiving one of the seven “nudges”
9See Luttmer and Singhal [2014] for a review of the tax morale strategies for tax compliance.
They identify three tax morale motivations in the literature, each grounded in a positive gain in
utility from the act of paying one’s taxes. These include: 1) a motive from reciprocity where the
taxpayer recognizes they are part of a larger group playing a non-cooperative game with other
taxpayers for the provision of public goods; 2) a motive from peer behavior where the taxpayer
gains utility from knowledge that they are part of larger group of contributors; and 3) an intrinsic
motivation that provides a direct utility benefit from the act of paying one’s taxes. Luttmer and
Singhal [2014] also mention taxpayer culture and taxpayer behavior other than utility maximization
as additional explanations for the rate of taxpayer compliance.
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is then compared to compliance for those who have not received a “nudge” dues to
random assignment to a holdout sample.
To understand the potential influence of each nudge, we model tax delinquency
as a problem of taxpayer procrastination following Akerlof [1991] and O’Donoghue
and Rabin [1999]. Procrastination occurs because of present bias as in O’Donoghue
and Rabin [1999] and declining saliency as in Akerlof [1991]. Present bias is always
present. Saliency can be nudged by a reminder letter. The reminder letters stressing
liens or liens plus the sale of one’s home add a future expected cost to non-payment
as in the tax compliance model of Allingham and Sandmo [1972]. The reminder
letters stressing the tax morale are modeled as utility gains to the procrastinator
from paying ones taxes. Economic theory, therefore, plays a central role in the design
and implementation of our field experiment. Late payments arise in our model due to
lack of salience, lack of deterrence or lack of tax morale. We have designed the field
experiment to test the importance of these three competing theories. We show that
the treatment effects that are identified by our experiment have a clear interpretation
in the context of the parameters of our model. Our experiment is, therefore, designed
to explicitly test competing models of behavior as recommended by Levitt and List
[2007] and Card et al. [2011].
Our work here is closely related to the recent work of Hallsworth et al. [2014]
studying the effect of taxpayer nudges on the timeliness of income tax payments in
the UK and to Castro & Scartascini’s [2015] study of local property tax payments
10
in Argentina. Like our study, the amount owed to the tax authorities in these two
studies is known by the authority and the taxpayer with certainty; the only issue is
payment. As here, the empirical analysis of Hallsworth et al. [2014] follows from a
model of taxpayer procrastination. The primary focus of their field experiments is the
framing of the morale nudge, comparing the effectiveness of what they call a descrip-
tive message (“a majority of citizens pay their taxes”) to that of an injunctive message
(“you should pay your taxes because”). Our analysis also includes a descriptive mes-
sage (“9 out 10 taxpayers have paid their tax”) and an injunctive message (paying
one’s taxes is a duty of citizenship”). We differ from the Hallsworth et al. [2014], by
including a more strongly worded message on the penalties for non-compliance and
by allowing a longer period of study for compliance behavior (3 weeks vs. 6 months
in our study). The longer period allows a sharper identification of the saliency of
each nudge. Finally, they study compliance for the payment of an important national
tax; we study compliance for an important local tax. Like the work here, Castro
and Scartascini [2015] study citizen payment of their local property taxes. They also
examine effectiveness of separate nudges that stress legal and financial consequences
of non-payment, the advantage of payment for the provision of neighborhood ser-
vices (street lighting), and the fact that seven of ten taxpayers do pay their bills on
time. However, they do not consider the effects of saliency nudges independent of the
content of the nudges, which is one of the key objectives of our analysis.10
10We conducted an earlier pilot study of property tax compliance in Philadelphia. The results are
reported in Chirico et al. 2016. In contrast to our results here, we find evidence that tax morale
11
Our experiment supports three central conclusions. First, saliency of the tax
obligation matters. A simple reminder letter has both a statistically significant and
quantitatively significant impact on the rate of taxpayer compliance, though the effect
wears off over time. Second, beyond the simple reminder, the content of the “nudge”
matters as well with those stressing rising financial penalties having the greatest im-
pact on compliance. Those appealing to a tax morale – neighborhood, community,
peer behavior, and civic duty – were no more successful than the simple reminder
letter in inducing additional tax compliance. Third, the marginal revenue benefit of
our most effective message is significant, raising $36 in new revenue for each $1 of
administrative costs. That said, however, the aggregate effect of nudges on uncol-
lected revenue is modest, bringing in only 5% of all revenue still owed, at least in
Philadelphia.
motives drive by public good provision, peer effects, and civic duty can positively impact property
tax payment compliance; see footnote 56 below.
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Chapter 2
Teacher Turnover in Wisconsin
Literature Review
Because the potential policy implications of turnover in the teaching profession (from
human capital and equity/distributional perspectives both) are far-reaching and poly-
partisan, the literature on turnover-related topics in education is extensive. As relates
to this chapter, there are five broad (and often overlapping) categories of inquiry: the
relationship between turnover and wages, which has tended to focus on “opportunity
wages” outside of the field of education; the relationship between turnover, school
demographics, and other nonpecuniary benefits, which has tended to focus on dis-
tributional inequalities–whether teachers with certain characteristics are more or less
likely to be teaching certain disadvantaged groups; the relationship between turnover
and teacher quality as measured by student performance, usually value added (VA);
collective bargaining agreements in education, focusing by and large on the implica-
13
tions (or lack thereof) of seniority-preferential clauses; and the recent phenomenon of
specific retention incentives, the provisioning of wage bonuses to teachers willing to
teach in high-needs schools.
One of the earliest papers attempting to rigorously investigate turnover was a
panel study of teachers in Michigan by Murnane and Olsen (1990), who used college
degree field wages outside of education as opportunity wages, finding the expected
lower exit rate for teachers with higher wages in teaching relative to the authors’
defined alternative. Dolton and Van der Klaauw (1999) use panel data on university
graduates in the United Kingdom to estimate a competing risks model of the decision
to leave teaching entirely, finding results in line with Murnane and Olsen (1990).
Returning to panel studies in the US, Loeb and Page (2000) use PUMS data to
get an idea of teacher relative wages in many states and find that dropout rates
fall when teacher relative wages are high. Stinebrickner (2002) also uses panel data
(this time NLS-72) to track both teachers and non-teachers, focusing in particular
on young teachers who leave the profession for long stints, and finds that the best
predictor of female exit is recent childbearing, which is an important consideration for
all work related to teacher turnover because such a high percentage (76 nationwide) of
teachers are female. Lastly, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) focuses on teachers in
Texas and emphasizes that the characteristics of students are much stronger factors in
predicting teacher exit than are wages (while also affirming the statistical significance
of pay).
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While wages have been found consistently to have some measurable effect on
teacher turnover, it is impossible to explain within-district migration (which con-
stitutes a large portion of switching–as much as 50%) through wage-only channels
because contracts are fixed at the district level. As such, another strand of literature
has chosen to focus on the nonpecuniary aspects of the decision to take a teaching
job–school environment/rapport, student enthusiasm, neighborhood characteristics,
etc.–usually by directing attention to a single district so that any wage-based con-
siderations are stifled, as is the case for Boyd et al. (2005) and Engel, Jacob, and
Curran (2014). Boyd et al. (2005) track early-career teachers in New York City as
they quit or transfer out of the city, and most importantly finds that commuting time
is an important, often overlooked aspect of location preference. Engel, Jacob, and
Curran (2014) leverages a unique data set from Chicago Public School job fairs which
affords them a rather strong measure of teachers’ demand for vacancies, neutralizing
the influence of school administration’s behavior on turnover (through poor match
selection or other means). The authors contribute evidence that the school’s neigh-
borhood (perhaps due to ambient crime or other reputational effects good and bad) is
a better predictor of teachers’ preference than distance from home, going somewhat
against the grain of Boyd et al. (2005). Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2007)
examine statewide data from Georgia, but ignore wage effects, choosing instead to
focus on disentangling the contributions of low student achievement and minority sta-
tus to turnover; they find that minority status is the more salient associate of teacher
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exit.
The key element missing from all of the above studies is perhaps the most impor-
tant consideration in the issue of teacher turnover–teacher quality. None of the studies
above have student-teacher matched data, and so are unable to directly associate stu-
dent outcomes with any given teacher. If, with respect to any measure of quality you
would like, I find that transitioning teachers are identical to their replacements, the
issue of teacher turnover is not, in fact, much of an issue. Thus, the recent trend in
the literature to incorporate measures of teacher quality (in large part made possible
by a trend towards administrative records allowing students to be linked to teachers
and tracked over time) in considerations of teacher turnover has made big strides in
addressing the most policy-relevant questions to be asked. The most common and
widely accepted measure of teacher quality is VA11 (in its various guises), and the
literature has begun to incorporate such measures into studies of teacher turnover.
Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) consider VA as a measure of teacher productivity, and
ask if common results of labor search theory (namely that turnover falls with tenure
and that turnover is negatively associated with match-specific productivity) continue
to hold in the education labor market. In fact, the authors find that the teachers most
likely to switch schools are those with low measured match quality, and especially that
11The most commonly cited expositions on value-added, its validity, and so on are probably Rivkin,
Hanushek, and Kain (2005), an extensive exploration of the predictive powers of empirical Bayes VA
measures; and Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014a) and Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014b),
the largest-scale study of long-term inferences based on VA.
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those who leave teaching entirely are those with the lowest match quality. The results
are more pronounced for schools with high proportions of low-SES students, which
has strong policy implications, as it appears the best teachers in high needs schools
are the least likely to change jobs. Goldhaber, Gross, and Player (2007) performs a
similar analysis with the longitudinal data of North Carolina and comes to similar
conclusions, strengthening the robustness of the results. Lastly, Goldhaber, Lavery,
and Theobald (2015) examine the inequity in the distribution of teacher quality by
high-needs groups in Washington state, and find that for all three measures of quality
(teacher experience, licensure exam score, and VA), the distribution of teachers favors
the less needy (as measured by free/reduced-price lunch status, minority status, and
low prior academic achievement).
The aforementioned papers have tended to keep the collective bargaining aspect
of salary determination for teachers out of the spotlight, if largely for reasons of
data restrictions. Nevertheless, it stands to reason to believe that the rigid struc-
ture of union-negotiated contracts could serve to contribute in a large way to teacher
turnover. Ballou and Podgursky (2002) give much descriptive evidence of the shape
of the wage-tenure profile, rooted in a data set collected by the Department of Defense
and published by the AFT. They find that seniority premia in education largely mirror
those in more traditional white collar professins, that steeper profiles are associated
with less turnover, and that district financial and demographic conditions alone are
insufficient to explain variation in contracts. Another common (and recently quite
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controversial, as evidenced by the contention in the ongoing contract negotiations in
Philadelphia) feature of union-negotiated teacher contracts are seniority priviliges–
preferential treatments granted to teachers in voluntary and involuntary transfers.
Moe (2006) codes contracts from 158 districts in California according to the strength
of seniority rights therein guaranteed to teachers and finds that such rights are associ-
ated with the distribution of teachers across schools (measuring quality as experience
and certification) in a way that serves to harm minorities. Revisiting California with
a slightly different sample and definition of the “determinacy” of the contracts with
respect to seniority, Koski and Horng (2007) come to the opposite conclusion–that
there is no such relationship. As a rebuttal, Anzia and Moe (2014) pin the difference
in results on the exclusion in Moe (2006) of small school districts, where it appears
that the entrenchment of bureaucracy falters and the rigidity of contract language
wane, a claim which they support by repeating their analysis with the inclusion of an
interaction for district size–indeed, for small districts the result of Koski and Horng
(2007) holds, while the insight of Moe (2006) holds in larger districts. Cohen-Vogel,
Feng, and Osborne-Lampkin (2013) use data from Florida and their results align
with those of Koski and Horng (2007) (though they neglect to nuance their results
by district size).
Finally, an emerging strand of literature is looking at the potential for trans-
fer bonuses and retention incentives to positively affect student outcomes. Fulbeck
(2014) analyzes a scheme in place in Denver whereby teachers who choose to trans-
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fer to high-needs schools (low-performing) are given recurring bonus pay, and those
initially stationed there are given retention incentives. She concludes that recipients
of incentives are significantly less likely to switch jobs, as driven by a reduction in
district exit rates and especially by teachers whos incentive payments exceed $5,000.
Glazerman et al. (2013) evaluate the Talent Transfer Initiative, a randomized con-
trolled trial conducted in 10 districts whereby high-performance teachers were given
$20,000 over the course of two years as reward for transferring the identified high-
needs schools, and conclude that there were significant effects on teacher retention as
well as on student outcomes.
Two highly germane papers investigate the impact in Wisconsin on teachers of
Governor Scott Walker’s flagship policy, Act 10, which severely limited the scope
for collective bargaining in the state. Litten (2016) uses differences in contract re-
newal dates surrounding the policy’s enactment to evince the effect of unionization
on teachers’ wages, and finds the lack of union bargaining power reduced teacher
compensation by 8%. Biasi (2017) constructs value-added measures from grade-level
test results and concludes that the move to individually-negotiated salaries in some
districts had a significant impact on teacher quality and student outcomes in such
districts, while also cautioning that most of these gains are competition-based, so
that scaling up the system state-wide would have an impact limited to a boost from
the exit of low-quality teachers.
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Data
The State of Wisconsin’s Department of Public Instruction (DPI) releases annual
Salary, Position & Demographic reports through the WISEstaff data collection sys-
tem. These reports represent “a point-in-time collection of all staff members in public
schools as of the 3rd Friday of September. . . ” (Public Instruction 2017a), and will
serve as the primary source of data on teachers in this chapter. Data are available
at the position-teacher level cross-sectionally, with each entry in a given year corre-
sponding to one of possibly several positions/assignments held by each school district
employee12. Identifiers in each file permit unique identification of an employee within
a given year, but this identifier does not follow teachers between years13. To overcome
this substantial hurdle to identifying teacher mobility, data are first fed through the
matching algorithm described in further detail in the Appendix. Essentially, I are
aided by the availability of various imperfect identifiers which should be more stable
over time, most crucially teachers’ first and last names and year of birth. By build-
ing on these covariates and incorporating some limited fuzzy matching techniques,
I construct a panel of teachers spanning the 1994-95 academic year (AY) through
12Many teachers (and other district employees) serve in multiple roles within a school/district, for
example as a coach, part-time program aide, or department head. Each of these is filed as a separate
observation in the DPI system, though salary information is given at the teacher as opposed to the
assignment level.
13From AY2011-12, a field called the File Number appears to allow longitudinal tracking of teach-
ers. I use this in part to validate the matching algorithm; see the Appendix.
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AY2015-1614 consisting of 3,588,614 teacher-position-year observations. The match-
ing algorithm necessitates elimination of 26,304 (0.7%) observations over all 21 years
on account of belonging to teachers who could not be uniquely identified in a given
year of data due to exact overlap of their first name, last name, and birth year fields
with another teacher in the data15.
Specific to the exercise at hand, with data reliability and precision in mind, I
make the following series of further restrictions on the data. The introduction of
Wisconsin Act 10 introduced a substantial structural break in the labor market for
Wisconsin teachers, so I include only data from 2000-2010 to avoid conflating the
effects of this policy on teacher turnover with the earlier functioning of the labor
market (i.e., I do not want to mix the results from distinct equilibria of the teacher
labor market, but would instead prefer to analyze the pre- and post-Act-10 markets
separately). I drop all employees who are not full-time, full-year regular teachers of
a major core subject (all-purpose elementary teachers or English/Math) at a single
regular public school with a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree and fewer than 35 years’
recorded experience; taken together, these restrictions eliminate 79% of employees,
the lion’s share of which come from eliminating substitutes/support staff and teachers
of on-core subjects16. I then eliminate teachers with missing information on their
14For brevity, I herein refer to academic years by the spring year, e.g., AY2003-04 will be simply
2004.
15Technically, I use a slightly modified version of the name strings in making these eliminations
which, for example, eliminates initials – see Appendix.
16I also eliminate any teacher who appears in any role besides “Teacher” in any year. In particular,
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subsequent school or district and teachers with instability in their recorded ethnicity,
as well as teachers not categorized as white, black, or Hispanic, eliminating a further
0.2% of all employees17. Finally, I drop teachers’ multiple positions by keeping only
the highest-intensity position for each teacher, as measured by full-time equivalency,
resulting in a final count of 282,797 teacher-year observations – 49,325s in 449 districts
and 2,296.
The data used for the incorporation of counterfactual salary calculations is largely
the same, but with a few noteworthy differences. First, as noted in Footnote 16, the
main turnover data eliminated some teachers who transitioned in and out of being
categorized as a full-time teacher due to the muddling effects thereof on defining
turnover. This concern not being relevant to constructing the salary schedules, it
is not imposed for this data. Next, because all regular teachers are covered by the
this eliminates a nontrivial number of educators who begin their career with an “ease-in” period,
take a mid-career “leave” speckled with a transition to substitute teaching – perhaps during their
child’s infancy – or end it with a “soft retirement” period, during which they act as a substitute
teacher at some point in the midst of a career otherwise focused on teaching. Such teachers often
have part-time roles at several local schools, which introduces sufficient ambiguity in the definition
of mobility so as to obscure interpretation of results, so I opt for a stricter definition of full-time
teaching than is completely necessary.
17Wisconsin teachers are predominantly white (96%). As noted in the Appendix, I also use the
panel data to correct noise found in recorded ethnicity and gender over time for some teachers. In
the final sample, 427 and 345 teachers had their ethnicity and gender (respectively) adjusted in some
year(s).
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same collective bargaining agreement, the salary imputation data is less restrictive
with respect to the subject codes excluded from the data, and generally includes any
teacher not in special education. This data also ignores instability in recorded gender
and ethnicity within a teacher.
Finally, the salary data loses observations that are present in the turnover data
based on a series of cuts which are either required for COBS to function, or else
substantially increase the reliability of its output. The most noteworthy/far-reaching
of these numerical restrictions is to eliminate any teachers working in districts where
there are not at least 20 total teachers in each degree track for that year. While
ultimately arbitrary, this number is reasonable to limit the potential effect of an
individual teacher on an exercise determining 35 levels of pay with minimal functional
form restrictions. The other numerical flags require both the BA & MA track to be
represented at a district, for at least 7 distinct levels of experience to be represented
within a degree track, and for at least 5 unique values of the two measures of pay
(salary and fringe benefits) to be available in each degree track; all teachers at districts
failing at least one of these tests is dropped.
The sum total of all of these restrictions leaves us with an analysis sample of
356,265 teacher-year observations to be used to estimate pay scales, made up of 65,069
individual teachers in 209 districts over 11 years. In total, there is sufficient data to fit
3,708 yt(τ, c, d) curves, an average of roughly 100 observations per curve. Ultimately
around 22% of teachers have missing salary information18, mostly in rural districts
18HKR include like-minded restrictions, but combine teachers of different certification within an
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or other districts with only one or two schools and a small number of students.
I supplement the WISEstaff data set in several ways to incorporate information
about other characteristics of schools and districts in Wisconsin. To get school- and
district-level measures of socioeconomic makeup (percentage of students who are black
or Hispanic or eligible for free/reduced lunches) and community type/urbanicity, I
tap the Universe Surveys from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common
Core of Data, which provide this information on a yearly basis for all years in the
study19,20. At the district level, I also use this data to compute class size and the size
of the student body.
Lastly, I turn to DPI’s public data again to get school- and district-level perfor-
mance metrics. While Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) were able to obtain school-
and district-level average scale scores on a standardized test in Texas, such a metric
is not publicly available in Wisconsin for all years. Instead, I calculate student pro-
experience level, despite the headline importance of this factor to teacher pay – median pay at a
given level of experience is on average 17 higher for those with a Master’s degree.
19The method of recording urbanicity by the Common Core switched from being “metropolitan-
centric” to being “urban-centric” for Wisconsin from 2006 (Sable 2009). I map the corresponding
codes to match those used by HKR as well as possible, and use the data file from 2006, which has
both types of code for all US districts, to confirm that the pre- and post-2006 correspondence is
by-and-large working as intended. For a small number of districts/schools with missing urbanicity
codes in certain years, I use information about that entity from other years to inform urbanicity.
20Further, the WKCE data does not include a standard deviation field even in those years when
the school average scale score is available, precluding any attempt to standardize test scores and put
the data here on equal footing with that of HKR.
24
ficiency rates for each school and district as the percentage of test-takers deemed to
be at grade level in mathematics or reading in a given year on the Wisconsin Knowl-
edge and Concepts Examination (WKCE), which is administered to 4th, 8th, and
10th-grade students.
Salary Scale Imputation with Constrained B-Splines
For many years, the ubiquitous characteristic of collectively bargained teachers’ con-
tracts has been the salary table, which gives a mapping from the calendar year, a
teacher’s experience (their length of tenure at the current district), and their cer-
tification (typically Master’s vs. Bachelor’s degree) to their wage. This table gives
current teachers a clear understanding of how their pay will advance as a function
of their labor inputs, and thereby gives forward-looking potential teachers and po-
tential migrant teachers a clear understanding of their would-be pay arcs under a
district-switching decision-making framework, especially given that this information
is typically openly available.
It would behoove an econometrician seeking to understand education labor market
dynamics, then, to incorporate this information on future pay into their statistical
modeling framework. Unfortunately, this data is typically not available in a format
lending itself to easy analysis at scale – whether locked inside idiosyncratically format-
ted and sporadically-available contract PDFs or hidden behind large-scale freedom of
information act inquiries, the temporal and financial costs of scraping such data into
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a usable form can be substantial.
Much more common in empirical settings is access to teacher-year-level salary
data of the form yi,t = y(τi,t, ci,t, di,t) + εi,t, where τi,t, ci,t and di,t are the tenure,
certification, and district of teacher i in year t, and εi,t represents unaccounted factors
affecting the wage (e.g., not all teachers work full time, some teachers split their
time among duties yielding different pay levels, and many teachers supplement their
income with additional duties like coaching). Here I consider one approach and some
empirical lessons for trying to estimate the underlying mapping y(τ, c, d) from such
data.
There are a multitude of inference/imputation techniques suitable to the in-
ference of a latent function of unknown parametric form available in the statisti-
cian/econometrician’s palette. The powerful flexibility of nonparametric approaches
(local regression, splines, Random Fourier Feature expansions) is a double-edged
sword; as it happens, in this particular setting, even if I know linearity is not a
reasonable functional form restriction, I do know some very basic properties of the
underlying tenure-wage curves that will be violated in general by uninformed estima-
tion techniques. In particular, I know that such tenure-wage curves are non-decreasing
and that they are non-negative, i.e., y(τ ′, c, d) >= y(τ, c, d) whenever τ ′ >= τ , and
y(0, c, d) ≥ 0.
He and Ng (1999) introduce a linear programming approach to incorporating
monotonicity, curvature, and pointwise restraints to quantile regression spline esti-
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mation techniques, and Ng and Maechler (2007) present an overview of the R package
cobs which gives an efficient implementation of this approach (COBS standing for
Constrained B-Splines; B-splines are computationally-efficient basis functions for de-
gree k splines). The basic idea of quantile regression spline estimation is to swap
out the standard squared loss function for a quantile-dependent weighted absolute
loss function to target conditional quantiles instead of conditional means. Mono-
tonicity, point, and curvature restrictions enter as penalized terms to the objective
function; cobs expresses this in a fashion which facilitates the application of standard
linear programming techniques for efficiency, and handles internally the issues of knot
selection and penalty parameter assignment through cross-validation.
I implement and fine-tune this general approach with an eye to being as minimally-
invasive as possible. The first innovation is required by the poor performance of
standard COBS fit in extrapolation. Data sparsity in smaller districts means that
it is often the case that only a small range of τ values are observed in a given year-
certification-district. Monotonicty constraints are only built into the B-spline routine
internally; the underlying basis functions may produce decreasing fits outside the
observed range of data. To overcome this, I take a cue from the literature tack-
ling Runge’s Phenomenon (Runge 1901), wherein polynomial approximations tend
to exhibit extreme oscillations in extrapolation. This issue is one of the motivations
behind natural cubic/smoothing splines (see, e.g., Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani
2001; Wahba 1990; Green and Silverman 1993; or de Boor 1978), which handle this is-
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sue by using a simple linear basis function outside the outermost interpolating knots.
I incorporate this technique of linear extension only when necessary by testing the
COBS fit for monotonicity; τ values failing this constraint are replaced by extending
the final non-decreasing fit values through the end of the range of extrapolation.
Next, a major shortcoming of COBS for this context is its limit to one-dimensional
spline fits; while techniques for nonparametric B-spline fits are available in arbitrary
dimensions (see de Boor 1978), at present COBS is only capable of imposing mono-
tonicity on one dimension of a curve. In my context, however, y(τ, c) is increasing
not only with respect to τ , but also with respect to c (as, without fail until only very
recently in Wisconsin, certification was rewarded with a Master’s premium, typically
a percentage increase in wage). One solution would be to generalize the implemen-
tation of COBS to handle a second dimension by simply adding penalty terms along
this dimesion21. I abandon this approach because of the categorical nature of the
certification dimension – there are not numerical units to the difference between hav-
ing a Master’s vs. Bachelor’s degree. The assignment of such a number required
by this approach would itself become an implementation hyperparameter, meaning
that the ultimate fit would itself be sensitive to the particular choice of continuous
representation.
21Not to mention the empirical reality that the two-lane dichotomy is in fact false – it is very
common, nearly ubiquitous, for contracts to offer separate lanes for teachers with the same com-
pleted certification, but different levels of progress towards completing further certification. As this
dimension is impossible to glean from my data, I exclude it from the imputation exercise.
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Instead, I use a two-step procedure to fit the Bachelor’s and Master’s pay tracks in
serial. In the first step, I fit the Bachelor’s career track as a typical one-dimensional
COBS fit. In the second step, I first construct Master’s premia for each observation by
subtracting out the predicted Bachelor’s pay corresponding to each observed level of
tenure for a teacher with a Master’s degree. I then use COBS to fit a non-decreasing
Master’s premium curve over all tenure levels on these residuals, before finally adding
the Master’s premium and Bachelor’s fit curves to get the overall Master’s fit curve.
Monotonicity of the result is guaranteed by forcing upwards monotonicity on the
Master’s premium, a restriction in line with the empirical observation that Master’s
degree pay is often simply a fixed-percentage rise over the corresponding Bachelor’s
pay.
My implementation was also aided by the imposition of weak concavity on the
y(τ, BA). While not a theoretically-assured functional form restriction22, concavity
improves the goodness of fit notably. Small-sample district-level observations and
simple reduced-form regressions of wages versus quadratic forms in experience support
this shape’s validity. A variety of contracts obtained from a database for teachers in
nearby Michigan also meet this condition, and the decrease in marginal returns to
22In fact, in reality tenure-wage curves are often piecewise convex – year-over-year rises are spec-
ified as a percentage bump which eventually levels off to either linear increase or maxes out and
flattens. Nevertheless, the degree of convexity in that section of the curve tends to be low, which
leads COBS to fit a good linear approximation there. The lack of a concavity restriction on the
Master’s pay track allows fit curves which fit this pattern for this lane.
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experience is also commonly found in the wider study of labor markets23. I do not
impose this restriction on the fit for the Master’s premium (the only restrictions there
being non-negativity at 0 and, as mentioned, an increasing relationship with tenure).
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Figure 2.1: Pay in Milwaukee, 2003-2006
As an illustrative example of the patterns in the data I wish to quantify and
formalize, I turn briefly now to Milwaukee Public Schools, the largest district in
Wisconsin with roughly 32,387.73 teachers per year. Figure 2.1 depicts key moments
of the empirical distribution of salary in 4 years at Milwaukee Public Schools, broken
down by tenure and certification. The central lines on each plot (Bachelor’s pay
23See, e.g., Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003).
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track in blue, Master’s pay track in red) are the empirical median levels of pay, and
thus give a rough approximation to y(τ, c). The dashed-line intervals on either side
represent the 25th and 75th percentiles.
Notably, these intervals and the medians themselves tend to get quite noisy at
later stages in the career, especially for the Bachelor’s track. This fact that reflects
the almost universal certification of teachers by about 15 years into their career. This
is reflected in the bar graph below each set of curves, which shows the distribution
of teachers in each certification track by tenure. Almost all new teachers start with
only a Bachelor’s degree; the relative presence of Master’s degrees grows over time as
more teachers certify mid-career.
I can also note two more key empirical facts from this plot. First, the vanishing
presence of teachers in both certification tracks leads the empirical median to be
a poor approximation of y(τ, c) since it frequently fails to respect the fundamental
monotonicity constraint discussed above. With respect to tenure, this tends to affect
the Bachelor’s track later in the career as more teachers certify, and the Master’s
track very early in the career before teachers certify. The monotonicity with respect
to c of the median wage is mostly maintained here for Milwaukee, but this is not
always the case; my estimation procedure is thus careful to impose these restrictions
internally.
Second, structural breaks are an important empirical phenomenon in this con-
text. Each time a contract is renegotiated at a district, the tenure-wage curves can
31
potentially change shape dramatically. It is with this in mind that I refrain, given
my ignorance with respect to when such structural breaks occur, from combining
information from adjacent years in fitting a given year’s curve, an approach which
would substantially enhance the statistical power available to fit contracts for sparsely-
populated districts. Such a structural break is apparent in Milwaukee, for example,
between 2003 and 2004 and between 2005 and 2006, where the shape of the Master’s
pay scale has shifted notably. While I eschew, for example, full Bayesian estimation
of structural breaks in a given district, such techniques are applicable and worthy of
future exploration.
Goodness of Fit
Returning to the motivating example illustrated in Figure 2.1, I turn first to the
performance in Milwaukee, where, given the relatively large sample size, performance
is expected to be very good. Indeed this is the case, as seen in Figure 2.2. The COBS
fit has retained all the salient features of the empirical median return to experience
and certification, while simultaneously improving over this nonparametric conditional
median by ironing out nonmonotonicities found empirically as a result of small-sample
bias.
Perhaps more telling is the goodness of fit in minimally small districts. Four such
examples are featured in Figure 2.3. These four districts just barely satisfy the sample
restriction that at least 20 teachers be present in both the BA and MA pay track (each
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has fewer than 42 teachers, and only in a single year); for this reason, rather than plot
the empirical median, I simply present the full distribution of wage, experience, and
certification in these districts. Here again the COBS fit captures the essence of the
wage-tenure curve even in these sparsely-staffed districts. Both Montello and Manawa
evince the importance of the non-negativity constraint on extrapolated values of the
Master’s premium – given the absence of teachers so certified prior to the fifth year
of experience, some supplementary discipline is necessary to prevent the tail of this
curve from dipping below that for the Bachelor’s lane.
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A final check on the validity of the imputation procedure would be to compare
34
fit schedules side-by-side with the true schedules, e.g. through root mean-squared
error. As mentioned, this is typically a difficult undertaking on a mass scale since the
true schedules may be hard to come by in a parseable electronic format. Usually, a
smaller-scale version of this exercise would be possible through sampling, say, 5-10%
of districts at random and spending the time to extract actual schedules by hand for
this purpose. Unfortunately, with the passage of Act 10 and the abandonment of
collective bargaining in many districts, electronic copies of legacy contracts became
hard to come by – none of the large districts I contacted (nor their former union
representatives) had access to old copies of contracts they were willing to share, nor
could I find any but a very small number of these contracts online. I present here the
comparison of COBS-produced fit to true schedule in three district-year combinations
for which I could actually obtain the true schedule24.
As seen in Figure 2.4, the resulting fit is generally superb25. Only for the Bachelor’s
track in Monona Grove in 2009 does the COBS-fit curve depart substantially from
24These contracts and a few others from outside of the study time frame are available upon request.
25In terms of objective measures of the fit, the mean absolute error is $1,762, while the overall
median error is $812. This is evidence against the assumption built into the COBS routine of 0-
median errors εi,t, and is understandable – it is not uncommon for teachers to earn supplementary
pay from coaching or extra teaching duties that would push them above their salary-schedule-dictated
pay grade. With a more complete set of training data, one could potentially account for this by
treating the quantile of the data targeted by COBS (.5 by default, i.e., COBS is median-targeted)
as a hyperparameter to be fit by cross-validation to prevent overfitting (see Stone 1974 or Friedman,
Hastie, and Tibshirani (2001)).
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the true contracted schedule. Moreover, this departure is likely attributable to the
oversimplification taken in this chapter of restricting pay to follow only two “lanes”
(Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees), when in reality districts often differentiate among
holders of these degrees by rewarding those with more credit-hours of supplementary
coursework under their belts in pursuit of continued learning or a higher degree – in
fact, such coursework is often required of Bachelor’s-certified teachers, which means
it is likely that the later-career Bachelor-certified teachers observed in Monona Grove
are actually being paid according to a higher lane. This is exactly what is depicted by
the gray lines on the Monona Grove plot, which show the BA+12 and BA+24 lanes
are more representative of instructors at the later stages of their career in Monona
Grove (the data lack any way of detecting a given teacher’s extracurricular credit
accumulation).
I take the above as strongly affirming the utility of COBS as a tool for con-
structing wage-tenure curves from teacher-level salary data. It is able to gloss over
noise-induced non-monotonicities in the empirical median, not just with the rich data
found in urban districts, but also in sparsely-populated districts. Moreover, as ex-
plored in the case of Monona Grove School District, COBS can be seen as doing a
good job of capturing an aspect of the data which is still latent (namely, the degree
of progress towards further certification), and of being closer to the “true” schedules
that teachers use to make mobility decisions (since it is likely that teachers are able
to anticipate extra income from holding multiple roles and factor this into their as-
37
sessment of a wage offer). Lastly, the COBS routine is computationally attractive –
embarassingly parallelizable and implemented very efficiently, the whole routine runs
in a few minutes.
Turnover in Wisconsin
Percent of Teachers Who
Teacher
Experi-
ence
Remain
in Same
School
Change
Schools
Within Dis-
trict
Switch
Dis-
tricts
Exit Wis-
consin
Public Schools
Number of
Teachers
1-3 years 79.7 7.1 6.0 7.2 41,042
4-6 years 86.6 5.6 3.3 4.5 37,770
7-11 years 90.6 5.0 1.8 2.6 54,623
12-30
years
92.4 4.1 0.6 2.9 129,002
>30 years 80.3 6.4 1.1 12.2 20,360
All 88.6 5.1 2.0 4.3 282,797
Table 2.1: Year-to-year Transitions of Teachers by Experience, 2000-10
I move now to the core focus of my analysis, examining the distinguishing features
of turnover in the teacher labor market in Wisconsin. Table 2.1 replicates Table 1 of
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004), and as HKR found in Texas, most turnover in
38
Wisconsin is happening within districts and out of the profession26,27. In Wisconsin,
the fraction of teachers transitioning among districts is vanishingly small after a
“burn-in” period of roughly 6 years – only 1% of such teachers do so (compared with
3.1% for the comparable group in HKR), but is still relatively highest among the
youngest teachers – roughly twice as high for the “probationary” teachers (1-3 years’
experience) as for teachers with 7-11 years’ experience in both states.
By contrast, movement patterns within districts in the two states are very similar,
lending weight to teachers “earning their stripes” within a district to be able to choose
the best schools as a privilege of seniority. As expected, I also observe a U-shaped
pattern in teachers exiting Wisconsin public schools, which jibes with there being
two types of quits. Early-career quitters change to private schools, change state of
residence, or change professions; late-career quitters retire – especially evident among
teachers with more than 30 years’ experience, a group which sees a mass exodus of
fully 10 percent of its teachers annually. Results not included here break down the
26This and subsequent analyses were greatly facilitated by several facilities of the R programming
language, for which due credit must be given to R Core Team (2016), RStudio Team (2017), Dowle
and Srinivasan (2017), Xie (2016), Leifeld (2013), Dahl (2009), Henningsen and Toomet (2011),
Zeileis and Hothorn (2002), Zeileis (2004), Zeileis (2006) and Croissant (2012).
27I also note that some “turnover” identified by teachers not appearing at the same school in
the following year is in fact spurious – Public Instruction (2011) identifies a number of instances of
school districts merging during the timeframe of my analysis and hence disappearing from the data
altogether. I take care to reset the district and school switch identifiers off for these 82 teachers if
they appear in the newly-formed district in the subsequent period.
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exit rates by experience level, where this dichotomy is even more dramatic – first-year
exit rates are about 8 percent and quickly level off at around 2 percent before spiking
again past around 25 years.
As examined further below, the low rate of switches between districts appears to
be owing to the generally more rural nature of Wisconsin vis--vis. Texas. To wit,
Milwaukee is the only major urban area in the state, and its population (2010 Census)
of 594,833 would rank 7th in Texas. This means that two major types of movers in the
HKR data – Large Urban - Large Urban and Suburban - Large Urban – are limited
within the state to ending up in a relatively minor metropolitan area. HKR don’t
provide any results disaggregated by city, precluding any attempts to compare these
numbers more comparably to those that would obtain from eliminating the largest
cities in Texas.
Moving from the aggregate numbers to begin to examine heterogeneity in turnover,
Table 2.2 replicates HKR Table 2, and reverberates its most important conclusions.
HKR argue that there is little support for the idea that scores of young teachers are
using large urban schools as a training ground before “settling down” with easier
assignments in the suburb, based on the general low level of turnover from Large
Urban districts. I affirm the scarcity of transitions from districts in Milwaukee, while
also noting that such a path is certainly present, as evidenced by the plurality of
those who do leave Large Urban districts ending up in a Surburban district in both
settings. HKR also observe that the likelihoods of remaining in the same school and of
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quitting are roughly the same for urban and suburban teachers, an observation which
I can confirm in Wisconsin. I further note that while Table 2.2 only presents a cross-
sectional picture, the career-long trend reaffirms this – only 3.2% of teachers starting
their careers at a large urban district ever work at a suburban district. Lastly, I echo
the suggestion of HKR that this phenomenon cannot be driven purely by demand-side
constraints – in my time period of observation, I observe only 1,459 urban teachers
change districts, whereas 3,211 teachers were hired in suburban districts, though of
course this does not rule out arguments based for example on stricter screening of
applicants transferring from urban districts.
I note, however, that though tales of flight from troubled urban districts are
apparently anecdotal, they are far from apocryphal. To wit, while 50 percent of
districts have a net inflow (arrivals less departures) of four or fewer teachers (in
absolute value), Milwaukee’s net outflow was 533 teachers, and the five highest-inflow
districts, all suburbs of Milwaukee or districts adjacent the main university town of
Madison, saw in total an inflow of 229 teachers in this time. This being a two-sided
market, this state of affairs is perhaps largely attributable to the dynamic nature of
student populations at these districts – but these, as well, are reflective of the appeal
of the districts to parents (and teachers as parents).
As mentioned in the discussion of Table 2.1, the major difference with respect
to quantities observed in Texas appears to be driven by differences in the urban
landscape between Texas and Wisconsin28. This is supported by the overall similarity
28I also note a difference (as found in Table 2.2) in the relative shift in population among com-
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Urbanicity in Texas and Wisconsin, 2010
State
Co
m
m
u
n
ity
 T
yp
e
Texas Wisconsin
Large Urban
Small Urban
Suburban
Rural
Figure 2.5: Comparison of the Prevalence of Different Community Types
of magnitudes of transition rates to community types besides Large Urban in the two
papers. Figure 2.5 depicts this difference in landscape by comparing the distribution
of community types in Texas and Wisconsin in 2010 (bar widths reflect the relative
quantity of districts in Texas and Wisconsin). While both states are majority-rural,
the non-rural part of Texas is comparatively urbanized, whereas more than 90% of
Wisconsin districts are non-urban.
Returning to Table 2.2, I see that, as in HKR, the “stickiest” community type
is Rural – over 60% of Rural teachers remain Rural in both papers, and even fewer
munity types between the two states – Texas observed dramatic changes in its community type
distribution over the period of study of only 4 years, while Wisconsin only saw some movement from
Rural to Suburban communities over a longer period of 11 years.
43
Rural Wisconsin teachers end up in a big city than is the case for Texas. This may
reflect the similarity in prevalence of rural districts in the two states and a natural
similarity in preferences of rural teachers and districts. Lastly, I also find that the
community type transition patterns of younger teachers as compared to all teachers
are broadly similar.
Table 2.3 replicates Table 3 of HKR, and again confirms its most important in-
sights. Raw salary differentials predict teacher mobility, but the average pay dif-
ferential is not on average very large – only about $325, or 1.7% higher than the
counterfactually expected wage that would have obtained had the district-switching
teacher remained in their current district29. This premium increases with age for both
male and female teachers.
One potential explanation of the weakness of the wage results is that there simply
is not sufficient heterogeneity among available contracts to generate mobility incen-
tives. Figure 2.6 demonstrates that this is not likely the case. No matter their current
experience or certification level, a teacher in a district paying the 25th percentile of
wages for that experience-certification cell would gain on average 17% by changing to
a district at the 75th percentile. Especially for younger teachers, this potential gain
would accumulate annually to become a hefty sum over the course of the career –
29There are 777 teachers in the data who skipped one or more years before reappearing at different
school or district (perhaps representing leaves of absence for retraining or re-adjustment). For such
teachers, the counterfactual subsequent experience and reference curves are taken from their next
year in the data, rather than from simply incrementing their experience by one.
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Figure 2.6: How Much Do Teachers Stand to Gain from Changing Districts through-
out Their Careers?
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discounting the average annual gain for Master’s-certified teachers at 6% and adding
over 20 years, this means roughly $100,000 is on the table; results are more dramatic
for teachers at districts further in the tails of the wage distribution.
Attempting to isolate the influence of district characteristics on wage effects, HKR
suggest comparing the differential leverage of residual wages (the residuals being the
unexplained part of a Mincer-type regression) to get a more focused estimate of the
association between wages and mobility30. I run a similar regression, but evaluate
separate regressions not just for each level of experience, but also for each certification
track. This leads to a boost in the overall fraction of explained variance from 60%
cited by HKR to 87% here; as in HKR, other included covariates are consistently
significant, suggesting their strong independent correlation with salary levels.
Unlike HKR, I find the demographic-independent wage differentials to be no more
important than the uncontrolled raw wages, with the predicted wage improvement
amounting to 0.8%. In further contrast to HKR, I find a positive relationship between
experience and residual wage differentials, with mid-career district switchers experi-
encing roughly 1.4% higher wages upon arrival to their new employer, by contrast
to the null relationship for probationary teachers. This pattern is consistent across
the dimension of certification which was ignored by HKR, suggesting the opposite
30HKR mention they failed to adjust the standard errors associated with the adjusted wage dif-
ferentials to account for the fact that they involve residuals from a regression. I explored accounting
for this by bootstrapping the regression through resampling teachers and recalculating residuals, but
little changes as a result, so I present the naive standard errors for simplicity.
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result cannot be attributed to bias introduced by movement patterns of Bachelor’s-
vs. Master’s-certified instructors.
Student demographic differentials are very important for predicting teacher turnover,
a finding which held in Texas as it does in Wisconsin. Most distinguished in all expe-
rience classes and for both genders are changes in measures of student performance,
student poverty and the percetnage of black students – district switchers end up at
schools with 5% more students at grade level overall, an effect which is stronger for
female teachers and for young teachers. They also end up on average with about 8%
fewer students (school-wide) eligible for subsidized lunch and 7% fewer black students.
While this finding would need to be bolstered with experimental or quasi-experimental
evidence, it hints at the potentially limited scope of teacher labor market policies in-
tended to ameliorate teacher supply problems in hard-to-serve districts – schools can
much more easily exert influence over their compensation policies than they can dic-
tate their student bodies, but the latter appears more efficacious (see Fulbeck 2014
and Glazerman et al. (2013)).
Long-Distance Moves
One major aspect of teacher mobility glossed over by HKR is geographic separation.
A wide variety of frictions may be geospatially-related or -generated – social and
professional networks tend to be concentrated locally; there are typically substantial
fixed costs involved in moving (real estate closing fees, moving expenses, etc.); prefer-
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ences may depend on climate/geography; and so on. As a first pass at exploring how
long-distance moves may differ in nature from those over short distances, I reproduce
in Table 2.4 the analysis of Table 2.3 for only those moves where the distance between
the origin and destination school exceeded 50 miles (a distance deemed sufficient to
likely entail a physical move rather than simply an adjusted commute).
The preeminent distinction of long-distance moves is moderation – all average
demographic differentials moderate towards zero, suggesting a diminution of the im-
portance of these aspects in this population. The noteworthy exception to this trend
is among probationary teachers – young males experience wage increases in an up-
rooting move, while young females experience declines for long moves. More detailed
data would be needed to explore the mechanism at work behind this observation (in
particular, none of the differences – male vs. female or short- vs. long-distance moves
– have p values below .05), but one explanation is a higher willingness among bache-
lors to change scenery completely, while younger women may tend to be married and
moving with their partners. In any case, the overall importance of wages in long-
distance moves is close to zero, suggesting wage differentials are either of secondary
or tertiary concern in the associated decision processes, or that there is unsufficient
heterogeneity in wages at such distances to generate enough moves so motivated,
though the case of young male teachers does weaken the latter explanation.
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Supply and Demand for Subject Specialists
Another source of heterogeneity about which HKR have little to say is subject spe-
cialty. While it is true that all teachers on a given contract are typically paid indepen-
dently of the subject they teach, teaching a hard-to-staff subject should lead to more
bargaining power in the labor market (as such teachers are less easily replaced), so I
would expect such teachers to transition to more attractive positions upon moving.
Fully accounting for the demand side of labor markets would bestow higher confidence
in results which ultimately depend on the strategic interaction of the two sides.
I are aided in trying to explore this aspect of the teacher labor market by the public
availability of annual technical reports from DPI about various aggregate indicators
for the health of supply and demand for educators in Wisconsin (the last published
edition is Fischer, Swanger, and Skoning 2009). In addition to providing counts for the
number of educators graduating from the in-state education programs broken down
by subject area, the report uses a survey distributed to district administrators to
give a score (based, for example, on the market tightness – applications per vacancy)
in each Cooperative Educational Service Agency (CESA, the administrative unit for
districts between the school district and DPI) rating the need for educators in various
subject areas, including those in my study sample, Math, Reading, and Elementary.
Both Reading and Elementary are chronically over-supplied throughout the state,
whereas the demand for math teachers varies considerably. In a given year, the
market tightness for the former two subjects is roughly twice that in Math (e.g., it
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was 67.43 for Elementary, 28.65 for English/Speech/Theater/Journalism, and 24.22
for Mathematics). As a result, I expect to see some heterogeneity in labor market
success of specialists in Math as compared to the other teachers in my sample. Table
2.5 explores some of the basic insights on subject matter heterogeneity. To mitigate
the potential for degree holdings to skew results, I focus on Master’s holders and
obfuscate gender differences for brevity. Actually, there is little in this table to support
the hypothesis that math teachers are given a substantial advantage in the labor
market – math teachers earn more (both in nominal and beyond-demographic pay),
but this result is not significant. Further, English teachers are advantaged in ending
up at less economically disadvantaged and higher-performing districts.
Table 2.6, which parallels Table 4 of HKR, again uncovers a labor market func-
tioning similar to that in Texas. In particular, while HKR find Large Urban - Subur-
ban district switchers penalize themselves in pay but are rewarded in demographic-
adjusted pay, Wisconsin teachers lose out on both measures when leaving Large Urban
districts, albeit the residual pay penalty is much lower than that of nominal pay. This
difference does not appear to be attributable to HKR’s exclusion of certification as a
conditioning variable, as the pattern here differs insignificantly by degree.
The other results of HKR are confirmed in even more dramatic fashion. There is
strong evidence of selection on the student performance metric, which does vary quite
widely in suburban districts. Teachers leaving Milwaukee tend to end up at districts
with 38% more students deemed to be at grade level on the state standardized test.
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District Average
Characteristics
Campus Average
Characteristics
Large Ur-
ban to Sub-
urban
Suburban
to Subur-
ban
Large Ur-
ban to Sub-
urban
Suburban
to Subur-
ban
Base year salary (log) -0.056 0.018 — —
(0.012) (0.007)
Adjusted salary (log) -0.004 0.011 — —
(0.005) (0.006)
Average Student Characteristics
Percent proficient 37.9% 0.9% 35.1% 0.1%
(0.6%) (0.4%) (1.2%) (0.6%)
Percent Hispanic -11.3% -0.6% -7.3% -0.4%
(0.4%) (0.2%) (1.3%) (0.2%)
Percent black -56.9% -0.6% -59.7% -0.5%
(0.8%) (0.3%) (1.8%) (0.4%)
Percent subsidized lunch -55.7% -1.7% -61.1% -1.6%
(1.2%) (0.5%) (1.3%) (0.7%)
Table 2.6: Average Change in Salary and in District and Campus Student Charac-
teristics (and Standard Deviations) for Teachers with 1-10 Years of Experience Who
Change Districts, by Community Type of Origin and Destination District
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On the other hand, teachers leaving Large Urban districts (i.e, Milwaukee) for the
suburbs experience a precipitous drop of 57% black students and 56% subsidized
lunch eligibility. This is practically a tautological result, as the student demographics
outside of urban areas in Wisconsin are pretty uniformly non-minority – about 90%
of suburban districts have fewer than 10% black students, and about 60% have fewer
than 2% black students, whereas Milwaukee is about 60% black. Similarly, teachers
leaving Milwaukee for the suburbs have little choice but to end up in a district with
far fewer economically disadvantaged students – whereas 73% of Milwaukee students
are eligible, the median percentage in suburban schools is 12%.
The direction of these effects are preserved among suburban-to-suburban moves,
suggesting the importance of these factors even in areas where there is a wider array
demographically of destination districts. I also find evidence of selection into eco-
nomically better-off districts among suburban switchers, but the magnitude of this
difference is attenuated with respect to that reported by HKR. I do not find patterns
of selection on student performance as strongly as was found in HKR. This may be a
reflection of the crudeness of the proficiency measure as compared to the more vari-
able raw scale score measures used by HKR. Lastly, I confirm the finding of HKR
that there does not appear to be evidence that teachers are able to select into the
more desirable schools within their target districts – the differences in campus-level
characteristics are almost identical to the differences in district-level characteristics.
This is likely a reflection of supply-side constraints, as the choicest appointments in
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a district may be awarded to long-serving serving teachers (promotion from within),
as well as suburban districts perhaps having only a small number of schools at which
to teach a given grade level/subject.
Between District Moves Within District Moves
Black
Teach-
ers
Hispanic
Teach-
ers
Black
Teach-
ers
Hispanic
Teach-
ers
Percent proficient 10.7% 8.0% 2.7% 2.2%
(3.4%) (5.6%) (0.9%) (1.3%)
Percent Hispanic 3.2% -14.8% 1.0% -7.7%
(1.4%) (7.3%) (0.9%) (2.3%)
Percent black -21.1% -0.6% -2.1% -0.3%
(5.0%) (5.0%) (1.4%) (2.0%)
Percent subsidized lunch -19.1% -15.5% -3.5% -4.7%
(7.7%) (6.7%) (0.8%) (1.3%)
Number of teachers 81 37 638 228
Table 2.7: Average Change in District and Campus Student Characteristics (and
Standard Deviations) for Black and Hispanic Teachers with 1-10 Years of Experience
who Change Campuses
HKR examine the state of Texas, which features substantially more ethnic het-
erogeneity than does Wisconsin. As a result, they are better-equipped to identify
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heterogeneity in preferences by teacher ethnicity. In Wisconsin, however, only 2,372
of the 49,325 teachers are non-white, so my results are underpowered relative to HKR.
For completeness, Table 2.7 presents these results, which parallel HKR Table 5. Given
how few observations I have of black or Hispanic teachers switching districts, I eschew
any temptation to interpret these results. Only black switchers within districts pro-
vide enough records to interpret meaningfully. In Wisconsin, I find that, in contrast
to white within-district switchers, black teachers tend to migrate to economically
better-off and higher-performing schools (white teachers also select on percentage of
black students). This could simply be a reflection of differences in initial district
choice by black vis--vis white teachers – the median proficiency at a black teacher’s
first district is 36%, compared to 64% for white teachers (71% and 22% for reduced
lunch eligibility, respectively).
To the end of examining heterogeneity in the impact of school and district char-
acteristic differentials on teacher mobility, HKR present their Table 6, which breaks
down the three exit rates for each (weighted) quartile of the covariate distribution.
I replicate that analysis here in Table 2.8. Saliently, my results for the correlation
of school characteristics for within-district movers are qualitatively identical to those
found in Texas and similar in magnitude, which gives a stronger indication that I
have identified some fundamental nonpecuniary mechanisms driving sorting among
schools in a district.
Differences with respect to the results in Texas begin to emerge for the other
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Quartile of Distribution Probability
Teachers
Move to
New School
within Dis-
trict
Probability
Teachers
Move to
New District
Probability
Teachers
Exit Public
Schools
Residual salary
Highest — 1.5% 4.1%
3rd — 1.8% 5.0%
2nd — 1.8% 4.9%
Lowest — 1.9% 4.1%
Percent proficient
Highest 4.5% 1.9% 4.2%
3rd 4.6% 2.3% 4.2%
2nd 5.2% 1.7% 4.4%
Lowest 6.1% 2.1% 4.6%
Percent eligible for
reduced-price lunch
Highest 7.1% 2.1% 5.3%
3rd 5.6% 1.7% 3.8%
2nd 4.1% 2.0% 3.9%
Lowest 3.6% 2.2% 4.4%
Percent Black
Highest 7.3% 2.1% 5.9%
3rd 4.9% 1.6% 4.2%
2nd 4.7% 1.9% 3.8%
Lowest 3.4% 2.4% 3.4%
Percent Hispanic
Highest 7.6% 1.8% 5.5%
3rd 4.4% 2.0% 4.1%
2nd 4.3% 2.0% 4.0%
Lowest 4.0% 2.3% 3.7%
Table 2.8: School Average Transition Rates by Distribution of Residual Teacher Salary and Student Demographic
Characteristics (data weighted by number of teachers in school)
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destinations of school leavers (other districts and other professions). As noted in
Table 2.1, overall rates of switching districts are quite low compared to Texas and
national averages; conditional on this, the patterns of movement by quartile of residual
salary exhibit a similar pattern to that in Texas, with teachers in the lowest quartile
about 28% more likely to change districts than teachers in the highest residual pay
quartile. By contrast to HKR, however, who found the opposite association, I find
the same trend (at attenuated magnitudes) with respect to leaving Wisconsin public
schools, suggesting salary considerations are also important for teachers considering
options outside of public school teaching (or in other states).
I also find fairly strong patterns in quitting associated with subsidized lunch eligi-
bility and with the ethnic makeup of schools, with teachers at the most economically
advantaged schools 8% less likely to exit teaching; similar numbers obtain for both
the quantity of black and of Hispanic students. For teachers moving within districts,
I observe similar patterns.
Regression Results
Having identified some key patterns in moments of the data, I now move on to try and
separate the confounding effects of each of these and other factors in affecting teacher
turnover with the aim of identifying more fundamentally the association between
salient district and school characteristics on teacher turnover. Table 2.9 provides
the main coefficients of interest from a simple linear probability regression model
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Teacher Experience
1-3 years 4-6 years 7-11 years 12-30 years >30 years
First year base salary (log) 0.03 −0.09∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.01 −0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
First year base salary (log) * female −0.07∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.02 −0.02 0.12∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
Campus average student characteristics
Percent proficient −0.10∗ 0.03 −0.02 0.00 −0.07
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch −0.09∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.01 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Percent Black 0.04 0.22∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
Percent Hispanic 0.13∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.04∗ −0.19∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08)
Interactions
Black * percent Black −0.21∗∗ −0.13 −0.03 −0.03 −0.21
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12)
Hispanic * percent Black −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.12∗ −0.12∗∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.34)
Black * percent Hispanic 0.14 −0.23 −0.14 0.03 −0.53
(0.25) (0.23) (0.14) (0.11) (0.45)
Hispanic * percent Hispanic 0.14 −0.07 −0.21 0.26 0.61
(0.28) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19) (1.07)
Observations 33,108 30,244 43,509 98,753 15,217
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2.9: Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on the Prob-
ability that Teachers Leave School Districts, by Experience (linear probability models; Huber-White standard errors
in parentheses)
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predicting leaving a district (i.e., either switching districts or exiting teaching); this
corresponds to HKR Table 7.
By contrast to the strength implied in earlier results, the importance of student
achievement has dwindled in the regression specification, and only comes out as in-
dependently significant for probationary teachers. The same goes for base salary
differentials – in contrast to HKR, the evidence I find in favor of an independent in-
fluence of salary on turnover rates is sparse and concentrated among young teachers31.
This does not appear to be due to imprecision – the magnitude of HKR’s standard
errors follows closely those found for the Wisconsin data, despite my smaller sample
sizes.
HKR also found little independent evidence in favor of student economic status
factoring in to teachers’ mobility decisions, but I find fairly consistent support for
the importance of subsidized lunch eligibility prevalence. As mentioned above, it is
possible that the crude nature of the proficiency measure is only weakly identified,
and that some of the unaccounted for part of student performance is being captured in
other coefficients, especially subsidized lunch eligibility and student race. Even more
compelling would be to associate student performance (and other school/district-level
characteristics) more finely with the set of students actually faced by a given teacher.
31HKR also mention results not printed in their paper suggesting a paucity of evidence suggesting
class size is an important factor in teacher turnover decisions; I give tepid support to this statement,
as class size does indeed appear to be related to turnover, but somewhat weakly and only for younger
teachers.
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The results in HKR about the differential effects of student body makeup are
largely similar to those I find in Wisconsin. White and nonwhite teachers have op-
posite and significant correlations between the quantity of minority students in their
origin district and their likelihood of leaving it. These differential results tend to
modulate towards zero with experience, regardless of teacher or student race cate-
gory, and suggest a degree of assortative matching on ethnicity among districts in
Wisconsin (though the patterns for whites differ sharply from those of nonwhites, the
patterns for black and Hispanic teachers are hard to distinguish).
To account in a rudimentary way for district-specific hiring policies, HKR move on
to their Table 8 which repeats Table 7 (my Table 2.9) with district fixed effects. HKR
note that the patterns in responsiveness to wages are the same, though attenuated;
that coefficients involving student ethnicity are qualitatively unaffected; and that
schools with high achievement continue to exhibit lower propensities for turnover.
My results, presented in Table 2.10, are similar in that they closely resemble the
results without fixed effects, but with noted attenuation and weaker precision.
The most notable difference relative to Table 2.9 is the general weakening of
results regarding the importance of student characteristics for white teachers. While
partially attributable to a decline in precision, this adjustment suggests much of the
discovered correlation between student characteristics and exit probability for white
teachers can be chalked up to district-to-district heterogeneity in preferences or hiring
policies.
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Teacher Experience
1-3 years 4-6 years 7-11 years 12-30 years >30 years
First year base salary (log) 0.01 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.00 −0.17∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07)
First year base salary (log) * female −0.07∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.03 −0.02 0.13∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
Campus average student characteristics
Percent proficient −0.12 −0.04 −0.10∗ 0.01 −0.09
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch −0.07 −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 −0.21∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.11)
Percent Black 0.29 0.46 0.54∗∗ 0.03 0.38
(0.28) (0.26) (0.18) (0.10) (0.48)
Percent Hispanic 0.04 0.04 −0.23∗ −0.07 0.13
(0.18) (0.15) (0.09) (0.05) (0.25)
Interactions
Black * percent Black −0.19∗ −0.15∗ −0.06 −0.04 −0.17
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12)
Hispanic * percent Black −0.17∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.12∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.09
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.33)
Black * percent Hispanic 0.06 −0.15 0.02 0.09 −0.73
(0.26) (0.25) (0.15) (0.11) (0.48)
Hispanic * percent Hispanic 0.14 −0.04 −0.12 0.26 0.26
(0.28) (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (1.10)
Observations 33,108 30,244 43,509 98,753 15,217
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2.10: Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on the
Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts with District Fixed Effects, by Experience (linear probability models;
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses)
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Local Wage Ratio
Perhaps a better measure of the influence of a teacher’s wage on their propensity to
move is their potential gains from changing to nearby districts. Table 2.11 presents
results of a specification paralleling that in Table 2.10, save for the replacement of
the initial Bachelor’s salary as a predictor with a measure of a teacher’s local relative
wage. Specifically, the local relative wage is defined as the ratio of a teacher’s next
scheduled wage to the wage ceiling at districts within 50 miles of their current district
(excluding their own) The wage ceiling is calculated as the maximum wage at the
teacher’s subsequent level of experience and certification in such districts. If this
measure exceeds one, a teacher is getting paid more for their current qualifications
than is possible locally; otherwise, they stand to gain in pay from switching to at
least one school locally. This relative local wage measure is an even poorer predictor
of teacher churn than are local wage levels. Table 2.11 bolsters evidence that student
characteristics are more important than wage differentials for teachers considering
changing districts32.
Finally, the conflation of switching districts and exiting teaching may mask impor-
tant heterogeneity between these two choices. To separate these competing exit risks,
32Some of the other coefficients in Table 2.11 have changed somewhat substantially relative to
those found in Table 2.10. This is largely attributable to a different subpopulation of teachers
included in the results, as evidenced by the change in sample size between the two tables. This
reflects differential missingness of the wage measures. The wage coefficients are qualitatively robust
to selecting a fixed population to estimate the models for the two tables.
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Teacher Experience
1-3 years 4-6 years 7-11 years 12-30 years >30 years
Local Relative Wage 0.00 0.01 −0.02 −0.02∗∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Local Relative Wage * female 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01∗∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Campus average student characteristics
Percent proficient −0.03 0.04 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch −0.12∗ −0.00 −0.02 0.00 −0.00
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Percent Black 0.18 0.31∗ 0.21 0.08 0.00
(0.23) (0.15) (0.13) (0.05) (0.01)
Percent Hispanic 0.09 0.09 −0.06 −0.02 0.00
(0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Interactions
Black * percent Black −0.11∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Hispanic * percent Black −0.06∗ −0.06∗ −0.08∗ −0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Black * percent Hispanic 0.25 0.25∗∗ 0.12 0.00 −0.00
(0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00)
Hispanic * percent Hispanic 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.02∗∗ 0.00
(0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 27,045 25,285 36,364 83,825 10,084
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2.11: Estimated Effects of Relative Local Wage and Student Demographic
Characteristics on the Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts with District
Fixed Effects, by Experience (linear probability models; Huber-White standard errors
in parentheses)
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Teacher Experience
1-3 years 4-6 years 7-11 years 12-30 years
I. Switch Districts
First year base salary (log) 0.66 −0.27 −0.81 1.36
(0.53) (0.74) (0.71) (0.91)
First year base salary (log) * female −1.12∗ −0.10 −0.36 −1.83∗
(0.52) (0.73) (0.73) (0.91)
Percent proficient −1.38∗ 0.16 −1.05 1.20
(0.60) (0.80) (0.89) (1.03)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch −0.57 −0.91 −1.98∗∗ −0.62
(0.40) (0.57) (0.64) (0.74)
Percent Nonwhite 0.15 2.11∗∗∗ 2.87∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.54) (0.58) (0.66)
Nonwhite * percent Nonwhite −2.45∗∗∗ −3.68∗∗∗ −3.08∗∗ 0.11
(0.56) (0.87) (1.04) (1.29)
II. Exit Teaching
First year base salary (log) 0.27 −2.29∗∗∗ −0.76 0.05
(0.52) (0.57) (0.64) (0.44)
First year base salary (log) * female −0.63 2.43∗∗∗ 0.73 −0.32
(0.51) (0.61) (0.65) (0.44)
Percent proficient −0.46 0.42 0.02 0.12
(0.57) (0.68) (0.71) (0.45)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch −0.88∗ −1.50∗∗ −2.31∗∗∗ −0.57
(0.39) (0.49) (0.53) (0.31)
Percent Nonwhite 1.24∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗
(0.35) (0.42) (0.46) (0.29)
Nonwhite * percent Nonwhite −0.97∗ −1.75∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗ −0.93∗
(0.42) (0.45) (0.47) (0.38)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2.12: Multinomial Logit Estimated Effects of Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on
the Probabilities That Teachers Switch School Districts or Exit Teaching Relative to Remaining in Same District
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HKR construct Table 9, which gives coefficients from a multinomial logit model with
three choices – remain in district, switch districts, and exit teaching. I repeat that
analysis here in Table 2.12, with the caveat that, given the sparsity in racial variation
present among Wisconsin teachers, I are unable to identify the full model specified
by HKR and mirrored above in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. In light of this, and in light of
the apparent similarity in Wisconsin in the behavior of black and Hispanic teachers
described above, I specify the multinomial logit model in terms of a more parsimo-
nious coefficient set. Namely, I distinguish between white and nonwhite teachers and
white and nonwhite students (instead of among white, black, and Hispanic students
and teachers).
I continue to see little evidence favoring the salience of wage considerations for
Wisconsin teachers; the strongest suggestions found here point to the importance of
wages for older male teachers in exiting teaching, a result which is generally opposed
to that found by HKR in Texas, where salaries were generally important, but only
for the propensity to change districts. Also as in the regression specifications, the
prominence of student proficiency found by HKR fails to make a notable appearance
in Wisconsin.
With respect to the importance of student demographics, my results again point
to the same effects found in Texas. White teachers seem to be spurred to change
districts or exit teaching by highly black student populations; the reverse is true of
nonwhite teachers, who can be drawn to remain in high-minority districts. Subsidized
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lunch eligibility’s strong effect observed in the combined specification is found here
to be concentrated more among those leaving teaching than those changing districts.
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Chapter 3
Active Learning Classrooms for
College Calculus Instruction
Literature Review
I have identified no studies that have evaluated the effectiveness of sufficiently similar
types of active learning classrooms as that studied here relative to traditional mathe-
matics instructional methods. There is, however, a body of prior literature comparing
the outcomes of online and blended instruction within both K-12 and postsecondary
education.
A previous study (Deslauriers, Schelew, and Wieman 2011) that measures instruc-
tional approaches that most closely parallel those studied here reported promising
findings for blended-delivery physics courses. In a semester-long randomized experi-
ment of calculus-based physics courses at the University of British Columbia, students
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who attended a course that was taught using an “interactive instructional approach
based on research on learning” (Deslauriers, Schelew, and Wieman 2011, 862) were
more likely to attend and be engaged in class than students attending a traditional
lecture-based section. Furthermore, students in the treatment section scored 33 points
higher on a post-experiment exam than students in the control group.
McGivney-Burelle and Xue (2013) perform the closest study in examining the
effectiveness of flipping a single unit of an intermediate calculus course analogous
in the calculus progrssion to that under study here. The study is non-random, but
has the unique aspect of mitigating instructor fixed effects by having the same in-
structor cover the flipped unit of the course. They report high student satisfaction
and engagement with this unit. Love et al. (2014) do a non-random evaluation of
flipped classrooms for college linear algebra and similarly find high student satisfac-
tion (though no significant differences in outcomes emerged). Given the non-random
nature of the two studies, suspicions of selection effects and external validity abound.
Other research provides a more mixed picture. For example, in a meta-analysis of
45 studies of online and blended learning across various postsecondary settings, Means
et al. (2009) found evidence of modest benefits of on-line versus traditional face-to-
face models of instruction on math skills. However, the largest skills gains were found
for courses that blended the two instructional formats. The authors note that several
factors in addition to the mode of delivery may contribute to these differences in skills
gains. In response to the Means et al. (2009) study, Jaggars and Bailey (2010) note
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that the findings do not hold up for semester-length courses delivered fully online.
Moreover, they note that the majority of the evidence base is limited to students
who were academically prepared to complete the coursework and, thus, have limited
applicability to those most challenged in traditional math classes. Andrews et al.
(2011) find instructor experience to be a key factor in the success of actively-taught
classrooms in their examination of college biology courses selected from universities
nationwide at random.
Two recent studies found mixed evidence of the effectiveness of online versus tradi-
tional math instructional strategies. Holding several student characteristics constant,
Xu and Jaggars (2011) and Xu and Jaggars (2013) reported evidence suggesting that
failure and withdrawal rates were higher and persistence rates were lower for students
in community college online courses than for students in courses taught face-to-face,
while Xu and Jaggars (2011) reported no evidence of differences in outcomes between
students in on-line versus blended instruction courses. Moreover, Xu and Jaggars
(2013) reported evidence suggesting that on-line instruction may be especially dis-
advantageous for males, Black students, and students with lower levels of academic
preparation.
Yet, there is evidence that context matters. For example, a recent randomized
control trial of rural middle school students taking Algebra I online found evidence
that these students outperformed their counterparts who did not have access to the
on-line course on their state mathematics assessments, quite likely due to higher level
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of access to any Algebra instruction, rather than as a consequence of the particular
instructional mode (Heppen et al. 2011). Berlinski and Busso (2015) implement a
randomized-controlled trial in Costa Rican secondary schools to foster active student
engagement with math and find significantly negative outcomes for treated students,
an outcome which they attribute to a deterioration in the quality of student-teacher
interactions in this group.
Study Setting and Instructional Contrast
The study focuses on strategies for teaching Introductory Calculus to college students
– a course that covers integration by parts, basic differential equations, and sequences
and series through Taylor Series representation of functions. This is a required course
for most college freshmen and a gateway course for prospective STEM students as
it is a prerequisite for most intermediate-to-advanced courses in engineering, math,
economics, chemistry and physics.
The setting for the study is a mid-sized private university where about 20 percent
of its freshmen enroll in the course each fall. The total study sample includes all
freshmen students who enrolled in the course in the fall terms of the 2014-15 or the
2015-16 academic years (N = 1,490). The course is taught each spring, as well, but
Spring enrollments are very modest relative to Fall enrollments and the Spring classes
tend to be populated by students who needed a semester of preparatory mathematics
instruction and students who failed the course previously. As such, I exclude them
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from comparison against students in Fall sections, though understanding the impact
of the intervention separately among Spring students is a topic of future interest.
The study examines the implications for student course performance of two con-
trasting instructional strategies for the course. All sections of the calculus course
under study had identical course goals, used a common textbook, and administered
the same mid-term and final exams. All instructors were expected to spend a total of
42 hours in the lecture sessions of the course (i.e., either three 1-hour or two 1.5 hour
lectures and a one-hour recitation per week), regardless of the instructional format.
The focal differences in the instructional strategies pertained to the classroom setting,
what work students are expected to do outside of the classroom, and how students
and instructors use class time.
Traditional Instructional Approach
The “traditional” mode of calculus instruction centers on the lecturer, who prepares
a talk on a topic each class period and presents a new tool or concept to the students
with slides, derivations on the chalkboard, and verbal feedback. Students are typi-
cally seated in tiered seating environments, and the audience may be between 60 and
100 students. Outside of the classroom, students are assigned problem sets (usually
on a weekly basis) that typically include a selection of exercises from the course’s
required textbook. Students are free to form study groups of their own accord; atten-
dance of the lectures may or may not be mandatory, depending on the instructor’s
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preferences33.
The Active Learning Classroom
The alternative instructional strategy being examined in this study is what I refer
to as an “active learning” classroom. In this setting, a significant proportion of class
time is used for instructor-moderated group work exploring and/or solving problems.
To facilitate group work, students in the active classrooms sit at mid-sized tables
(sitting 4-8 students per table). Generally, the class begins with an overview of the
scheduled topic, under the assumption that students will have read the assigned text
and viewed assigned online materials. A substantial portion of class time is used
for instructor-assigned problem sheets covering exercises intended to practice the
concepts and mechanics of a new tool or topic. Students work with other students to
complete the problem sheet in class, as the instructor and teaching assistants roam
the room to monitor and address questions. In cases where the instructor or teaching
assistants note student challenges with conceptual issues, he/she may interrupt the
group work to provide some general guidance – e.g., delineating the details of the
snag and offering guidance in how to think about the issue.
33This course also features weekly recitation sessions with a teaching assistant; classroom ob-
servations revealed these exercise-oriented hour-long reviews to be sufficiently similar across the
pedagogical modes that I eschew focusing on them in this analysis.
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Theory of Change
The core motivation for encouraging an active learning strategy is that students will
gain mathematical fluency more readily if they are engaged more tangibly with the
material. This may be especially true for introductory-level courses where becoming
comfortable with manipulating basic symbols and getting an intuitive understanding
of concepts through constant exposure to canonical examples following familiar pat-
terns can be seen as a fundamental step to success in higher-level courses that require
more and more abstract thinking. Such forced repeated exposure to worked examples
in a setting alongside peers is precisely the focus of the active learning instructional
mode under study.
Of course, group completion of assignments has long been an option for aspiring
students of calculus. The group setting designed for active learning sections differs
in several meaningful ways from the ad hoc association of students typical of more
traditional learning sections. First, students are aided by having on-hand the subject
experts (the course instructor and their teaching assistants). Observing in real time
how students struggle with the mechanics of implementing new concepts allows the
professor to address misunderstandings sooner than is possible in a setting where
students do not apply new tools on their own for perhaps several days after a lecture.
Active learning classroom groups can also be designed with more agency – with
some experience, an instructor may come to know which types of groups tend to suc-
ceed and which combinations are more prone to distraction (e.g., the professor may
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come to have a preference for “tracking” students within the class – assigning students
of like ability level to the same group – or to encourage mixing – perhaps having one
student with a higher level of mastery than their groupmates serving as local lumi-
nary)34. Devolving the group formation duty to the students themselves introduces
incentives which may run counter to maximizing conceptual understanding.
Lastly, related to the competing interests of laissez-faire groups, by establishing a
regular and formal exposure to this setting, students are likely to engage more openly
with their own mathematical erudition and become more comfortable describing their
math verbally to others, a key communication skill which may be otherwise lost or
longer in developing, particularly for students who are not naturally inclined to form
groups in such a course (whether out of confidence or timidity). Anecdotally, this
type of communication – explaining a new concept that is just beyond the reach of a
similarly situated peer – is a powerful way of moving from understanding to mastery
of new topics.
It is precisely this numeracy and comfort with communicating mathematical ideas
(and mathematical struggles) that is the intended mechanism for long-term advance-
ment in STEM generated by active-learning instruction. Forcing students to spend
three hours per week actively partcipating in discussions of math topics can lead to
quantitatively confidence, which is in turn a veritable prerequisite for STEM success.
34In informal talks with active learning instructors, the group assignment mechanism was to date
used somewhat sparingly, probably owing to the recency with which the instructors began utilizing
this mode.
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Study Design and Data
The implications for student performance of the instructional strategy used is being
tested in two ways – using a randomized controlled trial for the 2015-16 cohort and
using quasi-experimental methods for the 2014-15 and 2016-17 cohorts. This chapter
focuses only on the student sample from the 2015-16 randomized controlled trial.
For the randomized controlled trial, assignment was logistically constrained to be
blocked at the timeslot level to allow the course to fit in predictably with students’
multifarious scheduling constraints as it would have absent my intervention. To that
end, I coordinated with the course registration office to create ‘holding sections’ to
which students could register; what was visible to students during the enrollment
period is depicted for a representative lecture time slot by part A of Figure 3.1.
The students registered for each of the three holding sections were then randomly
assigned to a lecturer, two of which were available for each holding section, one
“traditional” and one “active” (section C in Figure 3.1), for a total of six lecture
sections for the class as a whole. These holding sections had the correct time of day
(for both the lecture and the recitation sections, as depicted in part D of Figure 3.1),
but did not reveal the format of the class or the instructor until after registration had
completed35.
35I could not incorporate upper-classmen (i.e., non-freshmen) to the randomization procedure.
Registration was opened to them much earlier, circa April, whereas incoming students by that time
had not necessarily even chosen their post-secondary institution. While taking this course in the
Spring semester is not uncommon, doing so after first year is quite rare; as such, I simply exclude
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Bb. Instructor 4
A
C
D
b. Instructor 2
(Max 20 each)
a. Instructor 3
b. Instructor 3
(Max 20 each)
a. Instructor 4
Section 2: Flipped 
Instructional Model 
(Enrollment Cap 70)
(Max 35 each)
b. Instructor 6
(Max 20 each)
a. Instructor 1
b. Instructor 1
(Max 20 each)
a. Instructor 2
Section 1: Traditional 
Instructional Model 
(Enrollment Cap 160)
Random Assignment
Lecture Time Slot A (Enrollment Cap 
230) & Recitation A-a or A-b
(Max 35 each)
a. Instructor 5
Figure 3.1: Framework for Assignment of Students to Traditional or Active Learning
Sections
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Time Slot # Registered Lecture Style # Assigned
A 170
Traditional 120
Active 50
B 190
Traditional 130
Active 60
C 130
Traditional 90
Active 40
Table 3.1: Initial Assignment to Lectures
I worked with the University Provost office, the Department of Mathematics, and
other internal partners to facilitate data acquisition and exchange. I use five primary
data sources – an initial pull from administrative data of registered students that I
used to randomize initial enrollees to the course over the summer; an administrative
cross-section of student enrollment records following the end of the add/drop dead-
line which delineated for each student the date they added their current lecture and
recitation sections, used to identify noncompliance; a follow-up cross section which
provides demographic data on course completers, as well as their final course grade36;
formal observations scheduled by my study team of active learning and traditional
these students from my analysis.
36I should note that because I only have two cross-sectional pulldowns of the data, there is likely
to be some measurement error in identifying the exact nature of attrition in the course. For example,
there could be students who switched more than once, or who switched before dropping, or who
added the course in one lecture mode and switched to the other.
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lectures and recitation sections, including the completed protocols returned by ob-
servers; the results of diagnostic exam scores administered by the department at the
beginning of the Fall term to help direct students to the appropriate math course;
and raw final scores, provided by the professors themselves, which give the most
accurate/comparable reflection of student performance on the common final exam37.
I supplement student demographic data in a variety of ways to make it more
digestible. First, I use the set of 200 students for whom both SAT and ACT perfor-
mance are available to predict a student’s missing SAT score from their ACT score
(and vice versa)38. I also spent some effort converting the students’ city of permanent
residence into a broader regional indicator, including identifying global cities to try
and place foreign nationals into cognate geographic groups.
Revelation of random assignment to the students took place a few weeks before
the start of classes in the fall semester of 2015, at which point students were free
(through the cessation of the standard university-wide add/drop period) to switch
37I were unable to obtain final exam scores for a small number of students that took a makeup
exam and still passed the course.
38A cross-validated/machine-learned approach would be preferable were this a more crucial part
of the analysis; for the purposes here, it was judged from a scatterplot of the scores that two simple
regressions would suffice. These had R2 0.41 (SAT from ACT) and 0.49 (ACT from SAT). More
broad-based conversions were considered (see, e.g., Dorans 1999), but the set of students at the same
school is likely a better comparison group to extrapolate to than is the whole country, i.e., I expect
out-of-sample predictive ability to be better using the regression fit with only my study sample than
it would be using a more general conversion between ACT and SAT scores.
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lectures/recitations as they saw fit (as they would with any normal class for which
they had registered). Numbers in Table 3.1 are illustrative of the registration and
assignment process (numbers have been rounded for anonymity). The active learning
classrooms are more space-intensive than traditional lecture halls, so I were logistically
constrained to randomize roughly 2
3
of students to the traditional sections in each time
slot.
Intent to treat estimates of program impacts (detailed below) will be based on
comparisons of students assigned to the two conditions. However, the interpreta-
tion of the study findings is complicated by two factors: (1) some students dropped
the class after assignment; and (2) many students changed section after the start
of the semester, leading to high rates of noncompliance with the randomly assigned
treatment condition. In an effort to track student mobility, I track students’ as-
signed lecture/recitation pair and pull two cross-sections of this assignment during
the semester (including final assignment).
Noncompliance
As seen in Table 3.2, attrition from initial assignment was high and dropping the
course was the most common outcome for this subsample – overall, 28% of initially
enrolled students did not complete the course39. There was also a considerable amount
39I also note that most students adding the course after the initial registration period were more
likely to end up in a traditional classroom. One explanation of this besides an ex ante preference
for the traditional classroom is a more flexible capacity constraint in the traditional classrooms.
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Destination
A B C
Trad. Active Trad. Active Trad. Active Dropped
A Trad. 68 1 3 1 6 2 19
A Active 22 29 12 0 6 8 24
B Trad. 4 0 58 2 2 1 34
B Active 3 0 14 51 5 3 24
C Trad. 4 0 5 2 43 7 38
C Active 10 0 8 2 15 38 28
Added 26 4 24 7 26 13
Table 3.2: Transitions from Initial Assignment (%)
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Figure 3.2: Diffusion of Students from Initial Assignment over Time
of noncompliance with treatment status, as many students switched from their ini-
tially assigned pedagogical style to the alternative; this was much more common for
students changing from active to traditional classrooms, especially in time slots A
and B.
Figure 3.2 presents the cumulative hazard curves for each lecture section, differ-
entiated by pedagogical type. Very few students changed section before the start
of classes; the exodus of students from initial assignment is largely concentrated in
Herein I treat these non-experimental students as I do the upperclassmen and exclude them from
the analysis.
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the first two weeks of “treatment exposure” (i.e., of attending their assigned class)40.
The active sections in Time Slots A and C saw an explosion of departures in the
first few weeks of the semester – more than 60% of initially assigned students would
ultimately leave these sections. As seen in Table 3.2, very few people who switched
sections opted to join an active learning section.
Students expressed a clear revealed preference for the instructors of Time Slots
A and B. Ex ante, this could have been anticipated, as a quick search of the univer-
sity’s instructor review system (openly available to all students and common cultural
knowledge) shows a long history of high-quantile reviews for both the A and the B
slot traditional instructors. By contrast, only Time B’s active instructor has recorded
experience teaching the same course at the university prior to Fall 2015. As seen in
Figure 3.2, this could be what is reflected in just how quickly students abandoned
their initial assignments – risk-averse first-year students are faced with a culture shock
in adjusting to college life and flock to the veteran instructors as a source of stability
and reliability.
40I currently lack demographics for students not present in the calculus course at end of semester,
and are thus unable to undertake an exercise of trying to find the best predictors of course dropping. I
did explore predicting whether students switch pedagogical modes, but there are no strong predictors
of either direction of switching among the individual-level observables I obtained. The strongest
predictor of changing lecture sections is initial assignment, suggesting some instructor fixed effects
which were confirmed anecdotally.
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Changed Treatment Status
Pell Eligible 0.12
(0.07)
SAT Writing (100) 0.08
(0.04)
Num. obs. 425
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.3: Using Observables to Anticipate Attrition
Predicting Switching
To find the best predictors of lecture switching, I used forward stepwise selection to
pick from a list of covariates to minimize the cross-validated (ten-fold) misclassifica-
tion rate; this process identified the best predictors in my data of switching lectures to
be the student’s math diagnostic score and Pell grant eligibility. The average misclas-
sification rate for this triplet of covariates was 43, which is not all that much better
than random guessing; the weakness of these predictors is confirmed in the summary
of this regression in Table 3.3.
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Variable Overall Active Traditional p-value
% Male 50 46 52 0.29
Ethnicity (%)
White 40 32 43 0.27
Black 9 11 9
Hispanic 12 14 11
Asian 17 21 16
Other 22 21 22
Age 17 17 17 0.59
U.S. Citizenship (%)
US Citizen 81 81 81 0.99
Perm. Res. 6 5 6
Non-Res. Alien 13 13 13
HS GPA 3.9 3.9 3.9 0.43
% without HS GPA 1 1 1
% from US 91 91 92 0.74
U.S. Region (%)
Mid-Atlantic 47 46 48 0.86
New England 4 4 4
Midwest 10 13 9
South 13 14 13
West 10 9 10
Rest of World 15 14 16
SAT (of 2400) 2100 2100 2100 0.91
% Missing SAT 19 21 18
ACT 33 33 33 0.89
% Missing ACT 50 49 50
First-Year Need
Average ($1000) 25 24 26 0.58
Median ($1000) 2 0 15 0.64
% Pell Eligible 14 16 13
Program (%)
College 77 78 76 0.80
Engineering 9 9 9
Nursing 1 0 1
Wharton 14 13 14
# Observations 360 110 240
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics by Initial Assignment
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Analysis
Covariate Balance
I demonstrate the adequacy of random assignment in Table 3.4. All categorical vari-
ables are tested for independence of assignment with a Pearson’s χ2 test; continuous
covariates are tested with a two-sample t test against the two-sided no-mean-difference
null hypothesis. The median first-year need is tested with a Wilcoxon rank sum test,
which has the null hypothesis that the distributions of gross need differ by a location
shift of 0. Figures have been rounded to help preserve anonymity, so percentages may
not sum exactly to 100. Balance is excellent, with only the highly skewed covariates
(such as HS GPA) having p-values below .8, so I are confident that randomization
was carried out successfully.
Evaluation Framework
The Rubin potential outcomes model (Rubin 1974) is the traditional workhorse of
causal econometrics in situations like that at hand where establishing a causal rela-
tionship is not trivial – despite the considerable effort exerted in designing an orthog-
onal covariate, treatment attrition means I still must take care in specifying what
exactly I’re identifying.
Letting Yi(0) = α0 + εi(0) be an individual i’s final exam score if they take the
traditional version of the course and Yi(1) = α0 + α1 + εi(1) be the score for the
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same student if they take the active learning version of the course, I can express
each individual’s observed score (noting that only one of Yi(0) and Yi(1) can ever be
observed) Yi as:
Yi = DiYi(1) + (1−Di)Yi(0)
= α0 + α1Di + εi(0) + (εi(1)− εi(0))Di (3.4.1)
Where Di is an indicator taking the value 1 if student i experiences the active
learning course and α1 is the treatment effect. If receipt of active learning instruction
were assigned randomly, the error term νi = εi(0) + (εi(1) − εi(0))Di would be or-
thogonal to Di (since εi(1) can be constructed to be mean-0) and the treatment effect
could be estimated with simple OLS (the point estimate being simply the difference
in average test performance between the treated and untreated groups).
Alas, it is not receipt of instruction but lecture assignment that is random in my
setup. As a result, Di is likely to be correlated with εi(1)−εi(0) – in a simple discrete
choice framework, Di = 1⇔ εi(1)− εi(0) ≥ −α1, i.e., selection on the unobservables
εi(s) mean a student’s choice to switch out of the active learning section signals their
predilection to benefit from active instruction.
All is not lost, however, since I still have an orthogonal piece of information which
will help separate selection effects from causal ones. First, I define Ti as an indicator
for random assignment to an active learning classroom. The intent to treat (ITT)
parameter is then given by β1 in:
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Yi = β0 + β1Ti + ui
That is, the ITT is the average difference in performance between those assigned
to treatment and those not,
β1 = E[Yi|Ti = 1]− E[Yi|Ti = 0]
Typically, one would use OLS regression to estimate this and get its standard errors,
but the relatively small sample and blocked nature of randomization lead us to prefer
a permutation test to evaluate the statistical properties of my point estimate. Secifi-
cally, the permutation test (which I also run within each time slot to evaluate effect
heterogeneity) consists of permuting the assigned treatment within each time slot and
calculating the difference in average raw exam scores that would have obtained under
this alternative treatment assignment, then repeating this dummy-assignment process
10,000 times. Under the null hypothesis that there is no difference in performance
between treatment and control, this process will generate a distribution of reasonable
estimates that may have occurred just due to sampling variability in the population
at hand. The test concludes by using this distribution to calculate the p-value which
is the percentage of permutations under which the observed difference in means is
at least as extreme as that actually observed in the data. If the null hypothesis was
assumed incorrectly, the observed difference in raw scores should be unlikely to have
occurred in a permutation of group assignments.
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Finally, I provide local average treatment effect estimates. The LATE approach
is to consider Di’s linear relationship to Ti:
Di = γ0 + γ1Ti + ξi
Combining this with Equation 3.4.1 produces an instrumental variables framework
with this as the first stage, i.e., Ti being randomly assigned ensures it is a valid
instrument for Di. Thus, α1 can be estimated even in the presence of the endogeneity
of Di; given the binary nature of both Di and Ti, it is possible to express this estimate
in terms of expectations (this is often referred to as the Wald Estimator after Wald
1940):
α1 =
E[Yi|Ti = 1]− E[Yi|Ti = 0]
E[Di|Ti = 1]− E[Di|Ti = 0]
The LATE gives the treatment effect for compliers – those that were induced to
take the active learning version of the course by having been assigned. I estimate it
as well with a permutation test approach.
Results
Table 3.5 presents the overall letter grade distribution, as well as its breakdown
by treatment status. The differences appear most striking in the composition of
students between the A and B letter grades for the two pedagogical styles, with
more treated students earning a B and more control students earning an A. The
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Overall Active Traditional
A 42 38 43
B 35 38 34
C 17 15 18
D 2 4 2
F 0 1 0
W 3 4 3
Avg. GPA 3.2 3.1 3.2
Final Score 10.0 9.7 10.1
Table 3.5: Outcome Data by Initial Assignment
“Average GPA” row quantifies this more numerically by converting each student’s
letter grade assignment to the corresponding grade point average and averaging this
across students in each treatment status, and confirms that control students have a
higher overall average GPA (I turn to the statistical properties of this point estimate
momentarily).
One drawback of using the final letter grade is its reflection of instructor feedback
from converting each students’ amalgamation of grades on homework assignments,
the midterm, and the final into a letter grade. This mapping has subjective elements
which may differ among professors or among treatment statuses (e.g., active classroom
professors may be more or less lenient to their students given the more regular and
intimate interaction they have due to the nature of their approach).
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All Students Full Compliers Partial Compliers
Intercept 0.15∗ 0.12 0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Active Learning −0.35∗ −0.41∗ −0.34∗
(0.15) (0.19) (0.17)
Num. obs. 345 254 287
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.6: Average Effects of Treatment on the Treated
To counteract this and get a more reliable measurement of student learning in
the course, I use as my main outcome of interest from the course the unadjusted
raw score on the common final exam. Every student in the course takes the same
exam at the same time, and the panoply of instructors and teaching assistants comes
together to grade all exams. These raw scores are then curved once the distribution of
scores is known, and this is finally fed into each student’s portfolio of grades and their
final grade assigned. The raw score is simply a number of correct/incorrect answers
on the exam, and as such is the most objective measure possible of each student’s
achievement in the course. The average (out of 15) of the raw score is presented in
the final row of Table 3.5.
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All Students Full Compliers Partial Compliers
Intercept −2.15∗ −2.61∗∗ −2.81∗∗
(0.88) (1.01) (0.90)
Active Learning −0.33∗ −0.34∗ −0.29∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
Male 0.10 0.15 0.17
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Black −0.69∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
SAT Score (100s) 0.11∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Num. obs. 345 254 287
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Coefficient on an indicator of student program was
excluded for confidentiality.
Table 3.7: Average Effects of Treatment on the Treated (with Controls)
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Treatment on the Treated
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present results for three specifications measuring the average effects
of treatment on students that ultimately completed the coure under an active learning
framework, i.e., treatment on the treated. The latter table includes The scores were
first scaled to facilitate interpretation of the values. Treated students perform worse in
the course than do those who experienced the traditional mode of instruction41. The
first column in both tables considers all students completing the course; the second
column examines only students who conformed exactly to their initial assignment.
The final column considers any student who did not change treatment status, i.e.,
who started and ended the course in an active learning environment (but perhaps
changed instructors). All columns use recitation-level clustered bootstrap standard
errors. These results show treated students pretty consistently performed about 3/10
of a standard deviation worse than non-treated students.
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ITT I ITT II ITT III ITT IV
Intercept 0.11 −2.75∗∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.03∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.82) (0.83) (0.90)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.15 −0.12 −0.01 0.07
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
SAT Score (100s) 0.12∗∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.26 0.24 0.24
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.14
(0.10)
Num. obs. 345 341 316 316
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Errors are from 10,000 section-clustered bootstrap
replications. Sample sizes differ due to missingness of high school GPA and/or pre-course
diagnostic score for some students.
Table 3.8: Regression-Based Intent to Treat
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Permutation Test of Difference in Scaled Final Scores
Figure 3.3: Permutation Distribution of ITT by Time Slot
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ITT I ITT II ITT III ITT IV
Intercept 0.11 −2.75∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.03∗∗
(0.06) (0.83) (0.86) (0.94)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.15 −0.12 −0.01 0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
SAT Score (100s) 0.12∗∗ 0.08 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.26∗ 0.24∗ 0.24∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.14
(0.11)
Num. obs. 345 341 316 316
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.9: Regression-Based Intent to Treat (Unadjusted SEs)
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ITT I ITT II ITT III ITT IV
Intercept 0.11 −2.75∗∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.03∗∗
(0.06) (0.81) (0.85) (0.93)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.15 −0.12 −0.01 0.07
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14)
SAT Score (100s) 0.12∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.26∗ 0.24∗ 0.24∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.14
(0.12)
Num. obs. 345 341 316 316
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.10: Regression-Based Intent to Treat (Asymptotic SEs)
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Intent to Treat
Table 3.8 shows some regression-based estimates of the intent-to-treat effect42. The
first column does a plain regression on the treatment indicator; the second and third
columns add covariates likely to explain exam scores for precision43. The final column
also includes a measure instructor quality for the instructor of the section to which
the student was assigned. This measure is a 0-5 rating derived from student feedback.
In none of the specifications is the initial assignment significant, i.e., the intent to
treat effect is statistically zero.
To explain why (despite this difference being insignificant) the coefficient on as-
41Recall from the discussion above that, due to selection on unobservables, these estimates are
likely flawed, as they are not immune to bias/inconsistency induced by student behavior. These
results are presented for completeness, and the causes of the differences between these biased results
and the unbiased results presented below are worthy of more detailed inquiry.
42Table 3.8 presents standard errors which result from 10,000 replications of resampling class
sections and re-estimating the model. For completeness, Table 3.9 uses un-adjusted standard errors
(i.e., the normal homoskedastic standard errors with V[βˆ] = σ2(XTX)−1), and Table 3.10 provides
standard errors derived from asymptotic results. None of the standard error specifications affect
the conclusions of the analysis. Though not strictly necessary to do the bootstrapped analysis, this
approach can be justified given the skewed (non-normal) nature of the final exam score distribution
– e.g., the p-value of the Shapiro-Wilk test for this variable is approximately 0.
43Of course, by including these variables, I have a priori reason to expect these may explain some
of the variation in performance. Their significance does not indicate an issue with randomization
(as a correlation of these characteristics with random assignment would), but rather their general
importance as a proxy for latent student ability. The same applies to the LATE analysis below.
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ITT I ITT II ITT III ITT IV
Intercept 0.11 −2.38∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.03∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.82) (0.83) (0.90)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
SAT Score (100s) 0.11∗∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.27 0.24 0.24
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.14
(0.10)
Num. obs. 316 316 316 316
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.11: Regression-Based Intent to Treat (with Consistent Population)
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ITT I ITT II ITT III ITT IV
Intercept 0.11 −2.65∗∗ −2.78∗∗∗ −3.32∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.80) (0.82) (0.89)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.15 −0.14 −0.14 −0.05
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
SAT Score (100s) 0.12∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.10∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.25 0.22 0.22
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.05∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.15
(0.10)
Num. obs. 345 345 345 345
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Students missing HS GPA were assigned a value of 0
for having a 4.0 as the average SAT score for this group falls far below that of the average
for either the 4.0 or the below-4.0 group. Math diagnostic scores were assigned by predicting
their value from an OLS specification using only total SAT score.
Table 3.12: Regression-Based Intent to Treat (Using Imputed Covariates)
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signment to active learning changes so dramatically from the second to the third
specification, Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 provide estimations of similar models with
slight adjustments to be sure the population in consideration is consistent. Table
3.11 does so by dropping students from Models I and II who are later dropped in
Model III. Table 3.12 does so by imputing the GPA and/or diagnostic score from the
student’s SAT score, so that the population in Models II, III and IV matches that of
Model I. Both make it clear that the source of the difference can be entirely ascribed
to the poor course performance of students missing a diagnostic score.
Model IV also evinces a notable change in the magnitude of the coefficient of
interest. The direction of the change indicate that the presence of higher-quality
instructors in traditional classrooms is at least partially the source of the negative
point estimates of treatment effects found in earlier models.
Figure 3.3 depicts a permutation test of differences in raw final scores grouped
by time slot. The test was blocked by time slot to account more accurately for
the blocked structure of randomization, and to control for any potential selection
of student types into time slots (for example, student athletes typically have tightly
constrained time schedules and can only possibly attend one time slot, and are likely
to differ systematically from the rest of the student population in other meaningful
ways).
In no case is the difference between the active and traditional classrooms on the
final exam significant, confirming the course-level regression results from Table 3.8.
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Permutation Test of Wald Estimator on Scaled Final Scores
Figure 3.4: Permutation Distribution of Wald Estimator by Time Slot
The same goes for an aggregated version of the permutation test where the assignment
is still permuted within time slots, but the difference in performance is calculated in
the course as a whole (i.e., corresponding exactly to the first regression in Table 3.8).
This point estimate is -0.15 and the associated p value is 0.2.
Local Average Treatment Effect
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 show models formulated with initial assignment as an instru-
ment for treatment – hence, the coefficient on being in an active learning classroom
corresponds to the local average treatment effect, namely, the treatment effect for
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LATE I LATE II LATE III LATE IV
Intercept 0.07∗∗ −0.28 −0.41 −0.29
(0.02) (0.29) (0.31) (0.33)
Active Learning (Assigned) 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
SAT Score (100s) 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Math Diagnostic Score −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Assigned Instructor Rating −0.04
(0.04)
R2 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.29
Adj. R2 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.27
Num. obs. 357 353 325 325
RMSE 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.13: First-Stage Regression for Local-Average Treatment Effects
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LATE I LATE II LATE III LATE IV
Intercept 0.13 −2.81∗∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.01∗∗
(0.07) (0.82) (0.86) (0.94)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.27 −0.22 −0.01 0.15
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.29)
SAT Score (100s) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.26∗ 0.24∗ 0.24∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.15
(0.11)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.14: Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects
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LATE I LATE II LATE III LATE IV
Intercept 0.13 −2.81∗∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.01∗∗
(0.07) (0.80) (0.85) (0.92)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.27 −0.22 −0.01 0.15
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.30)
SAT Score (100s) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.26∗ 0.24∗ 0.24∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.15
(0.12)
R2 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06
Adj. R2 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04
Num. obs. 345 341 316 316
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.15: Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects (Cluster-Robust SEs)
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compliers. The first-stage estimates (of the endogenous treatment indicator vs. the
exogenous random assignment indicator) are presented in Table 3.13, while the main
coefficients of interest are in 3.14.
As expected given the earlier discussion of absence of strong predictors for non-
compliance, only the instrument itself is strongly significant in the first-stage regres-
sion; this latter demonstrates that random assignment is indeed positively associated
with receiving treatment. The main results, in Table 3.14, show that there is again
no significant difference for treatment vs. control students. Table 3.15 repeats the
same analysis with section-level cluster-robust standard errors and implies the same
conclusion.
As above, the astute reader observed a large (though again insignificant) shift in
the magnitude of the treatment coefficient from Models I and II to Model III. Again
for robustness, Tables 3.16 and 3.17 account for this by using a consistent sample
to estimate the models (the former) and by imputing missing values for incomplete
observations (the latter). Again, I see that the suddent shift in coefficient is due
to attenuated exam scores among the set of students without math diagnostic exam
scores. A similar exposition as above applies to the change in coefficient resulting
from including instructor quality as a regressor.
Figure 3.4 shows the permutation distribution of Wald point estimates generated
alongside the ITT estimates produced for Figure 3.3. These distributions are char-
acterized by very fat tails as the permuted difference in ultimate participation in the
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LATE I LATE II LATE III LATE IV
Intercept 0.12 −2.39∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −3.01∗∗
(0.07) (0.87) (0.86) (0.94)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.04 −0.03 −0.01 0.15
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29)
SAT Score (100s) 0.11∗∗ 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.27∗ 0.24∗ 0.24∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.15
(0.11)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.16: Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects (Consistent Popula-
tion)
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LATE I LATE II LATE III LATE IV
Intercept 0.13 −2.72∗∗ −2.84∗∗∗ −3.33∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.82) (0.82) (0.90)
Active Learning (Assigned) −0.27 −0.26 −0.25 −0.10
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24)
SAT Score (100s) 0.13∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.10∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4.0 GPA in High School 0.24∗ 0.22 0.22
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Math Diagnostic Score 0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Assigned Instructor Rating 0.15
(0.11)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.17: Regression-Based Local Average Treatment Effects (Imputed Covariates)
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active classroom is often close to 0. Again the point estimates fail to show significance.
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Chapter 4
Procrastination and Property Tax
Compliance: Evidence from a Field
Experiment
Taxpayers As Procrastinators
Most city residents are law abiding citizens. If late in their city tax payments it is
unlikely it is part of a strategic plan to avoid ever paying. Property tax payments are
computed by the city as assessed home value times the city’s property tax rate and
are known both to the city and the taxpayer. While it is possible to avoid payment
by abandoning the property, this is very costly. For the vast majority of taxpayers
the only issue is timely payment. Taxpayers receive their tax bill in January of the
fiscal year with full payment or an agreed to payment schedule required by the end
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of March. Most families have the payment withheld in an escrow account as part of
their monthly mortgage payments. If payment, or enrollment in a payment plan, has
not been made by the end of April, the city starts enforcement proceedings against
the taxpayer. Enforcement begins with a reminder letter that all taxes and additional
accrued interest and penalties are now due. In Philadelphia, those reminder letters
are mailed in early May. I are studying the payment decisions of these tardy, or late,
taxpayers. Following the analysis of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), my late taxpayer
are seen as procrastinators who struggle with the problem of when, not if, to pay
their property taxes.44
My taxpayer makes a decision every two weeks or perhaps every month as they
pay their family bills. They can pay their taxes today, or postpone the decision until
“tomorrow.” If they pay their taxes today, they bear the immediate cost equal to the
payment made. Taxpayers enjoy a benefit from having paid their taxes, but those
benefits are not realized until “tomorrow,” either as the simple relief of knowing their
44I are not the first to model taxpayer compliance as a problem of procrastination; see Hallsworth,
et. al. (2014). I differ from their analysis in two ways. First, their focus is on late taxpayers as
possibly credit-constrained households. That is less of an issue for my work as all my taxpayers
are homeowners with assets that can used as collateral for a loan to pay taxes. It is true that
homeowners, particularly the elderly, may not utilize such loans, but that is problem of financial
literacy not tax compliance. Second, while I both rely upon the fundamental work of O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), I amend that analysis to include the insight of Akerlof (1991) on the importance
of “saliency” to the problem for procrastinators. I also extend the model to allow for active tax
enforcement by the city.
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taxes are paid or perhaps from the good feelings – that is, tax “morales” – of knowing
they have met their obligations to their fellow residents.45 This is O’Donoghue and
Rabin’s problem of the procrastinator facing immediate costs and delayed benefits.
The decision period is today at time t, where t represents the number of periods since
first receiving a notice that taxes are due. In deciding today as to whether to pay or
not pay taxes, the taxpayer’s inter-temporal utility function is specified over possible
dates for payment. If the taxpayer makes a payment at time t, lifetime utility at time
t is given by:
U tt = (ϕ
t+1βδ) V − ct (4.1.1)
where ct is the cost of tax payment at time t, and V is the benefit of knowing one’s
taxes are paid but not enjoyed until the period after payment. I assume V is constant
for whenever taxes are paid.
Benefits are evaluated in today (period t) dollars allowing for declining saliency
to future benefits and costs at rate ϕ (0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1), possible present bias to all
discounting at rate β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1), and the usual discounting of money values at
rate δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). If the taxpayer plans to make a payment at time t + s, then the
anticipated lifetime utility at time t of that payment is given by:
U t+st = (ϕ
t+s+1βδs+1) V − (ϕt+sβδs)ct+s s = 1, 2, ... (4.1.2)
45 I make the realistic assumption that my taxpayers will receive their public services whether
they pay their taxes or not. If they do not pay their taxes, then they will be free-riding on the good
will of their more responsible neighbors.
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where ct+s are the costs of tax payments at time t+ s. The costs of tax payment may
rise over time with accruing interest and penalties.
While tax payments made today are realized as a cost (ct) today, tomorrow’s
tax payments and tomorrow’s benefits are both realized in the next period, and are,
therefore, discounted for today’s decisions. Outcomes realized one period from today
are discounted at the rate ϕt+1βδ.
In my analysis the length of each individual period is relatively short, perhaps two
weeks to a month between paying one’s bills, and the overall decision horizon of my
delinquent taxpayer’s is no longer than several months. I will, therefore, assume that
δ = 1. The taxpayer may display a present bias, however, represented by a further
discounting of future costs and benefits at a rate β < 1; time consistent taxpayers do
not display a present bias so β = 1. Finally, my delinquent taxpayer may be forgetful
which I represent as a declining rate of awareness or saliency, ϕt+s. Constrained by
bounded rationality, taxpayers may only be able to pay attention to limited set of
facts or tasks (Akerlof, 1991). For the forgetful taxpayer, ϕ < 1; for the fully aware
taxpayer, ϕ = 1. In the extreme future or for the very forgetful taxpayer, ϕ ' 0 -
that is, “out of sight, out of mind.” Introducing the concept of saliency is a relatively
simply way to give “reminders” an explicit role in taxpayer compliance.46 As I discuss
in detail below, saliency can explain differences in the response rates of taxpayers in
the holdout sample and taxpayers that just received a neutral reminder letter.
46 Saliency and reminders play a similar role in the behavioral economics of health policies; see
Kessler and Zhang [2014] for a review.
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My analysis focuses on the type of taxpayer who O’Donoghue and Rabin identify
as the naive procrastinator. Here payment behavior stands in contrast to that of
the fully aware (ϕ = 1) and time consistent (β = 1) taxpayer who will always pay
her taxes on time (see below) and the sophisticated procrastinator who recognizes
she is forgetful and/or present biased but is able to commit to an optimal payment
schedule in advance. Here, that commitment device could be an escrow account
with the mortgage bank or a city arranged tax payment plan. In contrast, the naive
procrastinator assumes that she will remember to pay her taxes next period and do
so in an optimal, time consistent way – but she does not. As a result, she may
keep postponing payment until the end of the tax year when some drastic action –
for example, court seizure of the home or garnishment of wages – is taken to collect
all taxes, interest, and penalties due. Since both time consistent and sophisticated
procrastinators will have paid, or have arranged to have paid, their property tax, they
will not be in my sample of late taxpayers. Only naive procrastinators will be in my
sample.
How does the naive procrastinator decide to pay her taxes? She will pay her
taxes if the benefits from paying today are greater than benefits of paying at some
later date. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin, I assume the naive taxpayer adopts
what they call a perception-perfect strategy and pays her taxes today only if doing so
gives them more perceived utility today than by paying at some future date. In my
problem with constant V and rising costs ct+s because of accumulating interests and
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penalties, the best alternative date for paying taxes will always be in the immediate
next period t + 1. If so and assuming δ = 1, the naive procrastinator pays today,
if the lifetime utility of paying today is greater or equal to the lifetime utility if she
delays:
(ϕt+1β) V − ct ≥ (ϕt+2β) V − (ϕt+1β) ct+1 (4.1.3)
or if:
(ϕt+1β) (V (1− ϕ) + ct+1) ≥ ct (4.1.4)
The RHS of equation (4.1.4) is the perceived cost of paying one’s taxes today. The
LHS of equation (4.1.4) is the perceived cost of paying taxes one period later and is
equal to the actual payment of those taxes one period later (ct+1) plus the benefits
“forgotten” (V (1 − ϕ)) because of declining saliency. With time invariant benefits
(V ), if the perceived costs of paying one’s taxes one period later are greater than or
equal to the perceived costs of paying one’s taxes today, the taxpayer will pay today.
Current period costs of compliance will equal taxes owed (T ) plus accumulated
interest and penalties at rate ρ now due from not paying taxes in prior periods:47
ct+s = T (1 + ρ)
t+s s = 0, 1, 2, ...S, (4.1.5)
47Strictly speaking interest and penalties do not begin to accumulate until some number of periods
after the tax bill was first received. Rather than interest and penalties accumulating from the first
date of the receipt of the tax bill for t periods as specified here, penalties only begin to accrue
after a grace period. In the case of Philadelphia, the grace period between when the bill is received
and taxes are due is three months. I adopt this simpler specification for the timing of payments to
minimize the use of superscripts for dating all the periods. All that is required to ensure the same
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Where S is the terminal date at which point a very large penalty is imposed upon
the taxpayer for non-compliance, for example aggressive (harassing) enforcement or
seizure of one’s home. In the case of Philadelphia, after date S (December 31, 2015)
the tax bill of the non-complying taxpayer, now called a “delinquent” taxpayer, can
be given to a collection agency and the agency becomes the enforcer of payment.
That agency can obtain a court-order to garnish wages of the violating taxpayer. As
date S approaches the likelihood of compliance increases because of this very large,
expected penalty.
Substituting this definition into equation (4.1.4) gives:
ϕt+1β (V (1− ϕ) + T (1 + ρ)t+1) ≥ T (1 + ρ)t (4.1.6)
as the requirement for current period tax compliance. More simply, rearrange and
divide both sides by T (1+ρ)t and the condition for immediate tax payment becomes:
ϕt+1β (v(1− ϕ) + (1 + ρ)) ≥ 1 (4.1.7)
where v = V/[T (1+ρ)t] are the benefits of paying one’s taxes per dollar of taxes (and
penalties) paid. The RHS of equation (4.1.7) is the cost of paying one dollar of taxes
today; the LHS of equation (4.1.7) is the perceived costs of delaying and paying one’s
taxes in the next period. The perceived costs of delay are equal to the future benefits
“forgotten” per dollar of taxes paid plus the added tax penalties from waiting. The
level of accumulated penalties is to lower the rate of interest and penalties, ρ, in my specification to
reflect the grace period. All comparative statics from the model will be the same.
117
taxpayer will pay her taxes today if the cost of paying a tax dollar today is less than
or equal to the costs of waiting and paying that tax dollar in the next period.
In contrast to the naive procrastinator who is forgetful (ϕ < 1) and/or present
biased (β < 1) and may therefore delay payment, the fully aware (ϕ = 1) and time
consistent (β = 1) taxpayer always pays her taxes on time – that is, with penalties
and inerest, 1 + ρ > 1.
In addition to the usual passive enforcement of late payments that occurs through
the payment of interest and penalties when taxes are paid, the city may also use an
activist enforcement strategy that audits some delinquent taxpayers at the beginning
of the current period. If audited and determined to be a delinquent taxpayer, with
probability pi, the taxpayer must then pay an additional fine F in the next period.
F might include “booting” the taxpayer’s car, removing the taxpayer’s children from
school until payment is received, or additional fines equal to added administrative
costs plus penalties. A city might target its activist strategy at those taxpayers with
very large tax bills or with a year after year history of being a late taxpayer.
I assume, for simplicity, that activist enforcement is only in period t and not
later.48 If the taxpayer does not pay in period t, then under the activist enforcement
strategy, the expected lifetime utility in the next period if there is delay must allow
for the possible imposition of the penalty, F . In this case, the expected lifetime utility
48The extension to a model in which enforcement occurs in each period with probability pi is not
difficult and all results summarized in Proposition 1 also apply in that model.
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from a one period delay becomes:
U t+1t = pi [ϕ
t+2β V − ϕt+1βct+1 − ϕt+1βF ) + (1− pi) [ϕt+2βV − ϕt+1βct+1], or,
= ϕt+1β [ϕV − ct+1 − piF ] (4.1.8)
Now the taxpayer’s decision rule is to pay if the expected utility of delay is less than
the expected utility of paying today, or with the normalization that f = F/(T (1+ρ)t)
, if:
ϕt+1β (v (1− ϕ) + (1 + ρ) + pif) ≥ 1 (4.1.9)
Note that the likelihood of making tax payments increases in the activist enforcement
parameters pi and f . The following proposition summarizes the analysis above.49
Proposition 1. Naive procrastinating taxpayers will pay their taxes today if their
perceived expected lifetime utility of delaying payment is less than or equal to the
lifetime utility of paying their taxes today, or as long as the costs from delay are
greater than the costs of payment today. The likelihood of payment will increase as:
1. taxpayer present bias is reduced (β rises);
2. taxpayer saliency of future benefits and costs increases (ϕ rises);
3. the benefits or the tax morale from the act of tax payment increases (v rises);
49Equivalently, Equation 9 can be re-written as ϕt+1β(v(1− ϕ) + (1 + ρ)) ≥ 1− ϕt+1βpif , where
ϕt+1βpif can be interpreted as a “benefit” of early tax payment or “forgiveness” of tax penalties.
Penalty forgiveness is a common strategy to encourage tax payment.
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4. the penalties upon late payment or the subjective perception of these penalties
increase (ρ rises); and
5. activist enforcement probability (pi) and the fines (f) increase.
Proposition 1 provides the conceptual framework for the design of my field experi-
ment and the interpretation of my empirical findings. I design an experiment to eval-
uate the importance of three competing theoretical explanations of non-compliance:
lack of salience (Proposition 1.2), or lack of benefits or tax morale (Proposition 1.3),
or lack of deterrence (Proposition 1.4). I do not test Proposition 1.1, and therefore
implicitly assume that all tardy taxpayers suffer from a common rate of present bias.
Finally, my experimental design for Philadelphia does not allow us to evaluate the
importance of activist enforcement strategies (Proposition 1.5).
A Field Experiment
The research setting for the experiment is the City of Philadelphia for calendar year,
2015. Notices of property tax payments are sent on January 1, and the full balance
of taxes are due by March 31. If payment has not been received by that date, or
the taxpayer has not entered into a tax payment plan with the City, then taxes
are considered tardy and interest and penalties begin to accrue. On April 1, the
City’s Department of Revenue (DoR) begins contacting all taxpayers with unpaid
accounts, informing them of taxes due and accumulated interest and penalties for
late payment. At this time, the City will normally send two-thirds of the tardy
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accounts to outside collection agencies acting as co-counsel for the City. The outside
collection agencies are reimbursed at the rate of six percent of all their tardy revenues
collected by December 31. The remaining one-third of the tardy accounts remain with
the DoR for collection. All accounts still tardy on December 31 are designated as
“delinquent” and then assigned to new outside collection agencies. For the purposes
of my experiment the City of Philadelphia agreed to delay sending tardy accounts to
the collection agencies until August 15, 2015.
My experiment was implemented with those taxpayers newly tardy on March 31,
2015. Of the 579,828 properties in the city receiving 2015 tax bills, approximately
100,000 or 17 percent were late in payment as of April 1. Of these 100,000 properties,
27,264 still owed more than $10 as of May 15 and had not owed property taxes from
prior years. My experiment excludes all chronically delinquent taxpayers who owed
taxes from prior years. Of the 21,468 tardy taxpayers, 2,429 taxpayers owned more
than one property. While all 21,468 taxpayers were included in my experiment, I
focus my empirical work on the 19,333 taxpayers who owned only one property.50
My experiment began with the mailing of reminder letters in mid-June, 2015 and
continued to December 31, 2015. Of the tardy taxpayers with a single property,
16,940 received a standard or experimental reminder letter and 2,088 taxpayers did
not receive a reminder. This sample of 2,088 taxpayers became my “holdout” sample
and the basis for identifying the importance of saliency in taxpaying behavior. To
50 As a robustness check I repeated my empirical analysis for the full sample of and the results
are identical those I report in Sections IV and V below.
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ensure that my experiment was not contaminated by other treatments not under my
control, the DoR agreed to postpone all other enforcement activities until August
15. In particular, the outside collection agencies were not allowed to begin their
collection efforts until after that date. The likely earliest date that those efforts led
to any contact with a taxpayer is September 1.
Each reminder letter was approved by City’s DoR to ensure that it could be
understood by a taxpayer with at least a fourth or fifth grade level of English reading
comprehension. Each letter also provided contact information for assistance for non-
English speaking taxpayers. Translation were available for a number of different
languages.51
Each reminder letter in my experiment was drafted to identify the possible impact
on taxpayer compliance of the key variables in equation from Proposition 1. I could
not, however, measure the effect of either taxpayer present bias (β) because my sample
was limited to tardy taxpayers only. I also cannot evaluate the direct impact of a
more activist enforcement strategy (pi, f) as the city had not adopted such a strategy
in my sample year, 2015. I can identify the potential importance of taxpayer saliency
(ϕ), tax morales as they impact the benefits of tax payment (v), and interest and
penalties (ρ). For brevity I present here the important distinguishing feature of each
letter.
51Templates of the “reminder only” and “lien” letters are attached in the appendix. The full
template for the other letters are available as an online appendix.
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Reminder-only : My records indicate that you have a balance due of balance.
If you have already paid, thank you. If not, please pay now or contact us to arrange
a payment plan. The fastest and easiest way to pay is online at www.phila.gov/pay.
Paying by E-check only costs 35 cent – less than the cost of a stamp!
The reminder-only letter allows us to identify the potential importance of tax
saliency to taxpayer compliance. From Proposition 1 my holdout sample has a rate
of saliency of ϕt+1 when evaluating future benefits and costs. But those receiving
my reminder letter today have a rate of saliency when evaluating future benefits and
costs of ϕ only. When saliency is important, future taxes and benefits will be more
salient after the receipt of the reminder, thus increasing the likelihood of taxpayer
compliance; that is ϕ > ϕt+1, for ϕ < 1. A higher rate of compliance among taxpayers
receiving the reminder-only letter compared to those in the hold-out cohort identifies
a separate role for saliency in taxpayer compliance.52
Reminder plus Tax Lien: Failure to pay your Real Estate Taxes may result in a tax
lien on your property in an amount equal to your back taxes plus all penalties and
interest. When your property is sold, those delinquent tax payments will be deducted
from the sale price. By paying your taxes now, you can avoid these penalties and
52My experimental design can identify the presence of saliency by an increase in compliance for
those receiving a reminder letter, but time staggered reminder letters at a two-week or monthly
interval would be needed to identify the actual rate of saliency – that is, the value of ϕ. This was
not possible within the time constraints imposed by DoR on my experiment.
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interest. Properties near you in your neighborhood that have liens placed on them
include: < List Three Properties and Sale Dates > Pay your taxes now to avoid
a lien being placed on your property. My records indicate that you have
a balance due of balance.
Reminder plus Lien and Sheriff’s Sale: Failure to pay your Real Estate Taxes may
result in the sale of your property by the City in order to collect back taxes. In the
past year I have sold N properties in your neighborhood at a Sheriff’s Sale. Included
in these N properties are the following properties near you: <List Three Properties
and Sale Dates> Pay your taxes now to prevent the sale of your property.
My records indicate that you have a balance due of balance.
The reminder letter coupled with the threat of a lien, or a lien plus a sheriff’s
sale of the taxpayer’s home, increase the expected interest and penalties to the costs
of delay – that is, an increase in penalties (ρ). Both letters make clear that interest
and penalties will be collected by listing neighborhood properties where these added
enforcement measures have been implemented. A taxpayer lien for all interest and
penalties will be collected at the future date of home sale, which may be a very large
obligation if the home is sold significantly in the future. A lien coupled with a sheriff’s
sale may occur sooner and thus have lower accumulated interest and penalties, but
the forced sale of one’s home is likely to have very high psychic costs. Which of
the two added penalties is larger, and therefore likely to have a stronger impact on
compliance, will depend upon the circumstances of the individual tardy taxpayer.
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However, both letters should increase compliance over the holdout cohort from the
reminder effect on saliency and from the added expected penalty, and both letters
should increase compliance over the reminder-only letter from the added expected
penalty.
My final four reminder letters test for the potential role of “tax morale” motives
for compliance. An appeal to a tax morale is meant to cue a possible benefit from
having paid one’s taxes, apart from the actual receipt of services those payments
may make possible. In contrast to user fees, property tax payments are not tied to
the citizen’s receipt of particular services during my experimental period. In effect,
each delinquent taxpayer is a free rider, and the appeal to a tax morale for payment
is meant to overcome such self-interest. In my model of taxpayer compliance these
higher motives are captured by v in Proposition 1, the morale benefits from paying
per dollar of taxes, interest and penalties paid.
I test for the importance of four such motives: 1) the value of knowing one is
a contributor to the immediate services of one’s neighborhood, vN ; 2) the value of
knowing one is a contributor to the wider services that benefit the city as a whole,
vC ; 3) the value of knowing one is part of a collective effort with other taxpayers or
“peers” in paying for city services, vP ; and 4) the value of knowing one has meet one’s
obligations as a citizen in a democracy, vD. Each of these benefits may motivate tax-
payer compliance, and my reminder letters are meant to trigger a possible recognition
of the importance of each motive. Some tardy taxpayers may respond to one motive,
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some to another, and perhaps others to none at all if the free-rider motive is decisive.
The four tax morale reminder letters are:
Reminder Plus Appeal to Neighborhood Services : I want to remind you that your
taxes pay for essential public services in neighborhood name, such as <List Two
Local Amenities>, your local police officer, snow removal, street repairs, and trash
collection. Please pay your taxes to help the city provide these services in
your neighborhood. My records indicate that you have a balance due of
balance.
Reminder Plus Appeal to City-Wide Services : Your taxes pay for important services
that make a city great. Your tax dollars are essential for ensuring all Philadelphia’s
children receive a quality education and all Philadelphians feel safe in their neighbor-
hoods. Please pay your taxes as soon as you can to help us pay for these
important services. My records indicate that you have a balance due of
balance.
Reminder Plus Appeal to Peer Behavior : You have not paid your Real Estate Taxes.
Almost all of your neighbors pay their fair share: 9 out of 10 Philadelphians do
so. By failing to pay, you are abusing the good will of your Philadelphia
neighbors. My records indicate that you have a balance due of balance.
Reminder Plus Appeal to Civic Duty : For democracy to work, all citizens need to pay
their fair share of taxes for community services. By failing to do so, you are not
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meeting your duty as a citizen of Philadelphia. My records indicate that
you have a balance due of balance.
The morale benefits from knowing one has paid one’s taxes equals a weighted
average of these motivations (v) plus a possible additional weight (vi) when one of
the reminder letters reinforces or enhances the affected benefit from tax payment:
v+
∑
i ωivi, where i = N, C, P, or D, and where ωi = 1 if a reminder letter is received
targeting benefit i, and vi is the additional weight given to that motivation. I take
as evidence that an increase in tax morale increases the likelihood of tax compliance
when a tax morale reminder letter increases the rate of compliance above that of those
receiving a reminder-only letter. If none of the tax morale letters impact compliance
above a reminder-only letter then, at least on the margin for paying the property tax,
the free-rider motivation is decisive for tardy Philadelphia taxpayers. In this case,
increased enforcement will need to appeal to reminders and penalties.
Randomization Procedure
Randomization took place in two stages. As a baseline control, I randomly removed
3,000 tardy properties from the possibility of receiving any reminder letter at all,
representing 2,088 property owners. These taxpayers (N=2,088) became my holdout
sample and allowed us to estimate the efficacy of simply communicating with the
taxpayer after the date that taxes are due. I next grouped all remaining properties
by owner and randomized all owners to treatments based on the total amount of
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property taxes owed on all of their properties.
While the vast majority of properties in the city of Philadelphia are owned by
those with just one property, approximately 10 percent of the properties are owned
by individuals or firms that own multiple properties. Since I are interested in taxpayer
compliance and not property compliance, I identified owners of multiple properties
by their legal name and randomly assigned each owner to a treatment group.53 Any
tardy taxpayer holding multiple properties within each treatment group received the
same letter for each of those properties. Given the high correlation between the
propensity to pay taxes and total debt owed, randomization blocks were defined ac-
cording to owner-level total debt to assure uniformity of samples along the dimension
of debt owed. Each property assigned to receive a reminder letter was equally likely
to receive each of the seven treatments. Since most tardy property owners own only
one property, my main interest in this study will be households that only own one
property in the city. Once I restrict attention to this sample, I have 16,940 taxpayers
in the treatment group and 2,088 taxpayers in the holdout sample. The total sample
size is 19,028.54 Table 4.1 checks whether the treatment and holdout groups are bal-
anced based on the two most important variables, taxes due and assessed property
53I lacked an objective identifier such as a social security. There is some possibility that two or
more different owners have the same name, but inspection by the authors found this to be very rare.
To the extent that it occurs, I consider this random noise to the experiment.
54I also trimmed the sample and excluded the 28 owners with highest total assessed property value
due to large variance in debt owed among the largest delinquents. None of the findings reported in
this chapter depend on this trimming.
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value.
Table 4.1 shows that randomization was successful in the single property owner
sample. The average debt owed by each owner was $1,287 in the treatment group
and $1,233 in the holdout sample. The average assessed property value is $144,145
in the treatment group and $142,630 in the control group. As a further test of
my randomization procedure, I also checked to see whether randomization achieved
spatial uniformity throughout the geographic expanse of the city. As reported in
Table 4.1 geographic balance was achieved.
Next I test whether randomization was successful among the seven experimental
treatment groups. Table 4.1 shows the results for the unary owner sample. Overall,
I find no evidence that would suggest any problems with randomization. Results for
multiple property owners, which do not differ from results for unary property owners,
are reported in Table A2 in the appendix.
Empirical Results
Table 4.2 presents my core results for the three month period of my experiment
largely unaffected by the intervention of the two outside collection agencies hired
by the City to begin their own enforcement efforts in September, 2015. I consider
two distinct measures of tax compliance behavior. First, did the taxpayer make any
contribution at all towards their tax bill; this is the ever-paid response. Second, did
the taxpayer make a full payment of their tax bill; this is the paid-in-full response.
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The sample includes only the 19,028 taxpayers who own a single property.55 For ease
of interpretation, Table 4.2 presents OLS estimates for the linear probability model;
logit estimates are available in Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix and are identical
in significance and interpretation to the OLS results reported here.
The top line of Table 4.2 reports the mean rate of compliance of my holdout sample
for ever-paid or paid-in-full one month from the starting date of the experiment (July
15) and for the three months to the ending date of the experiment (September 15).
The rate of ever-paid compliance for taxpayers in the holdout sample rises from 30.5
percent after one month to 51.4 percent after three months; the rate of paid-in-full
compliance for the holdout sample raises from 23.5 percent after one month to 40.8
percent after three months. The rising rate of compliance for the holdout sample with-
out receipt of a reminder letter is explained within the O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999]
procrastination model by the presence of a terminal date to payment (S=December
31) at which time large costs to non-compliance can be imposed (e.g., garnishing of
wages, sale of the home, publishing of names in the Philadelphia Inquirer).
The next seven rows report the additional impact on compliance from my seven
treatment letters: Reminder-only, Reminder/Lien, Reminder/Sheriff, Reminder/Neighborhood,
55I have repeated my analysis for the sample of taxpayers, including multi-property owning tax-
payers. Results for the full sample are identical to those reported here for unary (single) property
owners. I limited my reported results and discussion to the single property owner sample. For
comparison, results for the sample with multiple property owners are reported in Appendix Tables
A1 and A4.
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Reminder/Community, Reminder/Peer, and Reminder/Duty. Receiving the reminder-
only letter increases the rate of compliance after one month for an ever-paid tax pay-
ment by 3.8 percent above the holdout’s rate of compliance and by 3.9 percent after
three months. Both effects are statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confi-
dence. These estimates for the reminder-only letter indicate the relative importance
of saliency to taxpayer compliance behavior. My letter is particularly effective early
in my experiment, where the pure effect of a reminder increases the rate of compli-
ance after one month by approximately 12 percent (= 3.8/30.5). While receipt of the
reminder letter is still effective after three months, its relative impact on compliance
behavior is less, adding an additional 8 percent (= 3.9/51.4) to the rate of ever-paid.
The same statistical significance and declining rate of impact on compliance is ob-
served for the outcome, paid-in-full. Here the reminder-only letter increases the one
month rate of compliance over the holdout sample by 2.2 percent on a mean rate of
holdout compliance of 23.5 percent (9.4 percent improvement) and the three month
rate of compliance over the holdout sample by 3.0 percent on a mean rate of 40.8
percent (7.4 percent improvement).
Adding a message to the reminder letter has a mixed impact on tax payer com-
pliance. Table 2 reports the joint effects of receiving a reminder and a message. Of
the six messages, only the reminder/lien and reminder/sheriff letters had a statisti-
cally robust added impact on compliance. After one month, the sample receiving the
reminder/lien letter had an additional 9.0 percent rate of ever-paid compliance over
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the holdout sample’s compliance rate of 30.5 percent rate (30 percent improvement)
and after three months, an additional 9.2 percent rate of ever-paid compliance over
the holdout sample’s compliance rate of 51.4 percent (18 percent improvement). The
impact is statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confidence. The results
for paid-in-full compliance for the reminder/lien letter are also quantitatively impor-
tant and statistically significant, adding 5.6 additional compliance over the holdout
sample’s one month mean rate of 23.5 percent (24 percent improvement) and an addi-
tional 7.2 percent compliance to holdout sample’s three month mean compliance rate
of 40.8 percent (18 percent improvement). Comparable impacts are observed for the
sample receiving the reminder/sheriff letter, where I observe a 24 percent (=7.4/30.5)
improvement in the rate of ever-paid compliance after one month, a 17 percent (=
8.8/51.4) improvement in ever-paid compliance after three months, a 19 percent (=
4.5/23.5) improvement in paid-in-full compliance after one month, and an 17 percent
(= 6.8/40.8) improvement in textitpaid-in-full compliance after three months.
No such consistent improvements in compliance above the reminder-only letter
are observed for those receiving a reminder letter with a “tax morale” message. This
is seen most clearly in Table 4.3 where I compare compliance in the reminder-only
sample to that of the samples receiving one of the six message letters. In this compar-
ison, both the reminder/lien and the reminder/sheriff letters stressing the penalties of
noncompliance have statistically significant and quantitatively important additional
impacts on compliance above reminder-only, both for the ever-paid and paid-in-full
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outcomes and at the one month and three month intervals. The lien letter adds more
than a 5 percent increase in the rate of compliance above the reminder-only letter
for ever-paid and about 4 percent to the rate of compliance for paid-in-full. These
effects represent a 10 to 15 percent improvement in the rates of compliance over those
obtained with the reminder-only letter. The sheriff letter also offers a significant im-
provement over the reminder-only letter, though the effects are slightly lower than
those obtained with the lien letter. Compliance rates for ever-paid increase by 3 to 5
percent and for paid-in-full by to 2 to 4 percent above those achieved with the simple
reminder. These effects represent a 9 to 11 percent improvement in compliance per-
formance over what had been obtained with a reminder only. Table 4.3 also shows
most clearly the inability of the tax morale reminders to induce greater compliance
from Philadelphia’s tardy taxpayers. Among those reminders, only the neighborhood
letter is ever statistically significant and its effect is negative (!) for those paying in
full.56
56My results for both the positive impact of penalties and mixed effectiveness of tax morale
messages are consistent with most of the current literature on “nudges” and tax compliance; see
Hallsworth [2014] for a thorough review. In the interest of full disclosure, however, my pilot study
Chirico et al. [2016] for this project did find a role for a community or duty letter in increasing
compliance. The control group in the pilot study received a reminder-only letter. Three other groups
received either a penalty letter, a community letter – your taxes pay for city schools, police services,
and fire fighters – or a combined peer/duty letter – 9 out of 10 Philadelphians pay their taxes; paying
your taxes is your duty. In my pilot the penalty letter had no additional effect on compliance over
that of the reminder-only letter. The community letter increased the rate of compliance above the
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It is worth speculating as to why my results here differ from those in my pilot
study. First, the pilot was run on a much smaller sample (3,900 single property
taxpayers) and thus the results were less precisely estimated. Second, and more
importantly, the sample for the study included only taxpayers who had not yet paid
by the middle of November, 2014 (the time of my pilot), and thus are very close
to being what the City will classify as a “delinquent” taxpayer as those who have
not paid by December 31 of the tax year. The sample therefore consisted of the
“most-tardy” of tardy taxpayers. Of these “delinquent” taxpayers who did make a
contribution in my pilot study, the contributions were typically only partial payments
of $50 to $150, suggesting these households may be seriously cash constrained. One
might then imagine that for this sample of tax payers penalties are irrelevant; they
cannot pay in full in any case. But a morale nudge might induce some payment in
the spirit of a “charitable contribution.” Consistent with this possible explanation
is the fact that the average rate of compliance of this sample over the six weeks of
my pilot was only 15 percent and the moral nudges boosted the rate of those making
even some contribution to no more than 20 percent. It would be very valuable to
design a larger experiment that seeks a compliance strategy for these very tardy or
delinquent taxpayers. For this sample, one could “cost” to early payment in Equation
9 to reflect a cashflow constraint there. Here the literature on liquidity constraints
reminder letter by 4 percent, but the effect was not quite statistically significant. The combined
peer/duty letter increased rate of compliance above the simple reminder letter by 2 percent and the
effect was statistically significant at a 95 percent level of confidence.
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is relevant; see Zeldes [1989]. My results are similar in statistical significance and
impact to those in Castro and Scartascini’s [2015] study of property tax payments in
Junin Argentina, the other major field experiment seeking to improve property tax
collection. For Philadelphians at least, and for the residents of Junin, it is reminders
and penalties that improve compliance among tardy taxpayers.
Table 4.4 estimates the longer run impacts of my seven nudge interventions on
compliance. The letters were sent on June 15th and received soon thereafter. The
first two columns of Table 4.4 show the estimated effects on compliance of having
received a letter six months later, again compared to compliance behavior in my
holdout sample. Now the reminder-only letter no longer has an impact on compliance
behavior, suggests declining saliency over time. Reminder letters that stress penalties
from a lien or a lien plus sheriff’s sale still have influence, however. The implied
increase in expected penalty from non-compliance appears sufficient to overcome the
loss of saliency. But again consistent with declining saliency, the estimated impact
of the lien and sheriff letters, while still statistically significant, are roughly half as
large as their impact at the one and three month intervals; compare Tables 4.2 and
4.4. Again, none of the tax morale nudges show a statistically significant impact on
compliance behaviors. 57
57The six month results need to be interpreted with care, however, as they are no longer part of
my experimental design. Beginning between mid-August and mid-September the City allowed two
private collection agencies to begin their efforts at collecting taxes from those in my original sample
of 19,333 tardy taxpayers who had not yet paid their taxes, including those in my holdout sample.
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The last two columns of Table 4.4 carry my sample into the next tax year, be-
ginning with the receipt of a new property tax bill in early January, 2016, and asks
if having received a reminder letter in June, 2015 improves compliance behavior for
the payment of the 2016 taxes by June of 2016. Consistent with the importance of
saliency, none of the 2015 reminder letters appear to have “staying power” into the
next tax year. Tardy Philadelphians need constant reminders.
Discussion
While of interest as a specification and test of a behavioral theory of tax compliance,
my results are also relevant for city tax collection policies. As a strategy for improving
collection from tardy taxpayers, my analysis informs two important policy issues.
First, cities need revenues: Do reminders improve collection, and then do reminders
with a message raise more money than a simple reminder? Second, in light of the
recent municipal fiscal crises and the potential for an unraveling of citizen commitment
to local governance: Do reminders with a message, and then which message, improve
tax collection as a “nudge” to citizen engagement? Table 4.5 provides answers to
these two questions.
Listed in Table 4.5 are my seven treatments, the sample size to which each treat-
The treatments therefore, become a joint intervention of my letters and the unspecified, proprietary
strategies of the collection agencies, which I then compare to the collection agencies’ strategies alone
as they impact those in the holdout sample. Whatever impact those proprietary strategies may have
on compliance, my lien and sheriff sale letters still appear to have a lingering, value-added impact.
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ment applied and total taxes owed, and then estimates of the impact of each treatment
on the number new payers three months after receipt of the treatment letter, the av-
erage new revenue received per letter sent, total new revenues collected from each
treatment letter above that paid by the holdout sample, and finally, the percent of
owed taxes paid because of each treatment.
For single property owners, the total number of new taxpayers above the holdout
sample from all reminder letters is 838, an average increase in the overall rate of com-
pliance from receiving one my treatment letters of 4.9 percent (838/16,940). Table
4.5 also provides an estimate of additional revenues raised by each of my treatment
letters and then the total revenue raised from each treatment group. From the per-
spective of the City’s Department of Revenue, my experiment was a good investment
of Department resources. Each letter cost about $1 to process and send. Thus es-
timated benefit to cost ratios for the seven treatments ranged from a low of $19.77
(the Neighborhood letter) to a high of $67.67 (the Lien letter). The approximately
$17,000 spent on my experiment to mail the 16,940 treatment letters raised $615,752
in additional city revenues: an average benefit to cost ratio of 36.3.
Among my seven treatments, my experimental results clearly show the power of
the lien and sheriff letters compared to a simple reminder or the tax morale nudges.
The number of new taxpayers above the holdout sample is three to four times larger
and the revenue/letter is two to three times larger with the letters stressing penalties.
As a consequence, total new revenues (above the holdout sample) from the penalty
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letters and new revenues as a share of all taxes owed are three to four times larger
as well. If I had sent only the lien or sheriff’s letter to the 16,940 taxpayers in
my treatment groups I would have raised $1.15 million in new revenues rather than
$616,752 – nearly twice as much. The paid share of taxes owed would have risen from
my experiment’s average of .028 to lien letter only of .053.
While the seven treatments are effective on the margin and the penalty letters
particularly so, the final column makes clear that at least in Philadelphia, my treat-
ments will not completely solve the larger problem of unpaid City property taxes.
The treatments encourage a 3 to 9 percent higher rate of compliance above the hold-
out sample, and the typical new taxpayer pays on average about 60 percent of what
they owe. 58 Thus the contribution towards total taxes owed will range from a low
of 1.5 percent for the neighborhood letter to a maximum of 5.3 percent for the lien
letter. Nudges help, and money is money, but at least in Philadelphia, they alone will
only partially solve the large problem of tardy and then delinquent tax payments.
Money may not be all that matters with tax collection, however. Voluntarily pay-
ing one’s taxes on time is a signal that one believes in what government is trying to do;
see Posner [2000]. From the U.S. Colonies’ resistance to British taxation in the 1760’s
to the boycotts of the apartheid government’s imposition of utility taxes on the resi-
dents of Soweto in the 1980’s, refusing to pay one’s taxes is a rejection of government’s
performance. In signaling games where there is a cost to non-compliance, the more
58The median taxpayer in my sample who pays taxes, pays $738 towards the (average) tax bill of
about $1200, or 60 percent.
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who indicate they favor your contrarian position, the more likely you are to publicly
express that position too; see Lohmann [1994] and Benabou and Tirole [2011]. In my
case, what may have once been a strong tax compliance outcome can unravel to a
new, non-compliance equilibrium when government no longer performs as needed for
a majority of citizens; see Besley, Jensen, and Persson [2015]. Recently, such an un-
raveling towards a low compliance equilibrium can be observed in Detroit. The city’s
rate taxpayer compliance for property tax collections fell from a ten year average of
.90 from 2000-2010 to a compliance rate of .68 by 2014 (Chirico, et. al., 2015). In
2013, 47 percent of Detroit’s properties were classified as delinquent.59 While nudges
help, a high initial value of V reflecting government benefits significantly greater than
tax costs may be the most important determinant of the aggregate rate of taxpayer
compliance and commitment to city government; see Haughwout, Inman, Craig and
Luce [2004].
59See Reese and Sands [2013] who conclude from their review of the economic and political events
leading to the Detroit fiscal crisis that “it is not surprising that many view the social contract
between property taxpayers and city government as broken.” (p. 9) Another example of this can
be seen in the 1990 taxpayer revolt to Prime Minister Thatcher’s introduction of a local poll (head)
tax; see Besley, Jensen and Persson [2015]. The regressive poll tax replaced a proportional property
tax. In response to widespread citizen resistance the poll tax was removed two years later and the
property tax restored. But compliance rates for the restored property tax were 14 percent lower
than before: .83 vs. .97. Efforts to restore compliance since then have stressed high penalties but
it has taken nearly eighteen years to return to the original rates of payment. Expected penalties
perhaps are no substitute for good governance for ensuring voluntary taxpayer compliance.
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Table 4.2: Short-Term Linear Probability Model Estimates
Ever Paid Paid in Full
One Month Three Months One Month Three Months
Holdout 30.5 51.4 23.5 40.8
Reminder 3.8∗∗∗ 3.9∗∗∗ 2.2∗ 3.0∗∗
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Lien 9.0∗∗∗ 9.2∗∗∗ 5.6∗∗∗ 7.2∗∗∗
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Sheriff 7.4∗∗∗ 8.8∗∗∗ 4.5∗∗∗ 6.8∗∗∗
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Neighborhood 1.7 2.7∗ −0.2 1.5
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Community 3.8∗∗∗ 2.8∗ 1.3 2.5∗
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Peer 3.9∗∗∗ 3.5∗∗ 1.8 3.4∗∗
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Duty 2.4∗ 3.6∗∗ 0.7 2.3
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5)
Num. obs. 19028 19028 19028 19028
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Holdout values in levels; remaining figures relative to the holdout benchmark.
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Table 4.3: Short-term Results: Relative to Reminder-Only
Ever Paid Paid in Full
One Month Three Months One Month Three Months
Reminder 34.3 55.4 25.8 43.8
Lien 5.3∗∗∗ 5.3∗∗∗ 3.4∗∗∗ 4.2∗∗∗
(1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Sheriff 3.6∗∗∗ 4.9∗∗∗ 2.3∗ 3.7∗∗∗
(1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Neighborhood −2.1 −1.2 −2.5∗ −1.5
(1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Community 0.1 −1.1 −0.9 −0.5
(1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Peer 0.1 −0.4 −0.4 0.3
(1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Duty −1.3 −0.3 −1.6 −0.7
(1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Num. obs. 16940 16940 16940 16940
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Reminder values in levels; remaining figures relative to this
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Table 4.4: Long-Term Linear Probability Model Estimates
Six Months Subsequent Tax Cycle
Ever Paid Paid in Full Ever Paid Paid in Full
Holdout 73.3 63.2 65.5 52.5
Reminder 1.3 1.5 −1.4 −0.7
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Lien 3.8∗∗∗ 4.8∗∗∗ −0.9 −0.7
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Sheriff 3.8∗∗∗ 3.0∗∗ −0.6 −1.1
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Neighborhood −0.2 −0.0 −3.1∗∗ −2.2
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Community 0.9 1.1 −1.8 −2.0
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Peer 1.3 2.3 −1.9 −1.1
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Duty 2.1 1.0 −1.6 −1.9
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Num. obs. 19028 19028 19025 19025
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Holdout values in levels; remaining figures relative to this
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Table 4.5: Three Month Impact of Collection “Nudges”*
Treatment Sample Total Taxes New Revenue/ New New % of Taxes
Size Owed Payers Letters Revenues Paid
Reminder 2,419 $3.038 M 95 $28.79 $69,643 .023
Lien 2,429 $3.109 M 224 $67.67 $164,370 .023
Sheriff 2,416 $3.177 M 213 $64.90 $156,798 .049
Neighborhood 2,387 $3.077 M 65 $19.77 $47,191 .015
Community 2,441 $3.149 M 68 $20.91 $51,041 .016
Peer 2,416 $3.092 M 85 $25.65 $61,970 .020
Duty 2,432 $3.159 M 88 $26.62 $64,739 .020
Totals 16,490 $22.143 M 838 - $615,752 .028
* Sample Size are the number of single property taxpayers in the treatment group. Total Taxes Owed is the total
taxes owed by single property taxpayers in the treatment group. New Payers equals the new payers after three months
computed as the estimated increase in rate of compliance of those receiving the letter over those in the holdout sample
as reported in Table 2; for example, for the reminder letter the number of new payers equals 95 = .039 x 2,419. Revenue
per letter for each treatment equals the median new revenue collected from those who received a treatment letter and
made some payment (=$ 738/letter) times the three month increase in compliance from each treatment letter; for
example for the reminder letter the median estimated revenue per letter equals $28.79 = .039x$738. New revenues for
each treatment equals the revenue/letter times the number of single owner properties receiving a treatment letter: for
example, for the reminder letter the estimated total new revenues equals $69,643 = $28.79x2,419. New % of Taxes Paid
equals New Revenues Divided by Total Taxes Owed; for example, for the reminder letter .023 = $69,643/$3,038,000.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
U.S. cities have a mixed record in their ability to collect taxes from their residents.
Some (Boston, Charlotte, San Francisco, San Antonio) do a good job, collecting over
98 percent of property taxes due, others (New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis) are less
successful, collecting in the neighborhood of 90 percent, and finally some, such as
Detroit and Flint, collect less than 70 percent of property taxes owed (Chirico, et.
al., 2016). Collecting property taxes should be straightforward; both the city and
the property owner know exactly what is due. While scofflaws, those permanently in
arrears, are a problem, most tardy tax payments are because residents forget or are
hoping to “let it ride” and not be noticed. We provide in Chapter 3 an extension
of the O’Donoghue-Rabin’s 1999 theory of procrastination to explain this behavior.
We then test three competing explanations incorporated in our model using a field
experiment on property tax compliance in Philadelphia.
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Our empirical analysis reached three conclusions. First, there is strong evidence
that salience is important. A simple reminder will improve compliance. The rate of
compliance rose by 4 percent with a simple reminder above that of our holdout sample
that received no reminder. But the effects of the reminder decline over time. There
is no evidence that having received a reminder in 2015, and having even paid your
taxes, improves your chance of compliance when paying your 2016 taxes. These re-
sults strongly suggest tardy taxpayers lack salience which is consistent with Akerlof’s
1991 work on procrastination. Taxpayers may have a limited capacity to remember
and process tax (and benefit) information when making their spending and financial
decisions. An explicit reminder that brings that information to the fore can encourage
payment. In this regard our results are consistent with those in Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft 2009 on the role of saliency in the payment of sales taxation and the results in
Bhargava and Manoli 2015 on the take-up rate for welfare benefits.
Second, a reminder letter with a “message” can improve compliance above a simple
reminder, but the content of the message matters. Two of our reminder letters stressed
increased penalties for non-compliance; one threatened to place a lien on the property
if taxes are not paid and the second threatened a lien and the risk of an immediate
sheriff’s sale if taxes are not paid. Both had a significant impact on compliance,
raising the rate of compliance by 9 percent over that of taxpayers who received no
reminder at all. This finding strongly supports the theory that tardy taxpayers lack
sufficient deterrence. The messages that did not improve compliance above that of
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a simple reminder letter were our four “tax morale” messages: one stressing your
taxes are needed for neighborhood services such as trash collection and the local
park, a second that your taxes pay for important city-wide services such as education
and protection, a third that 9 of 10 other Philadelphians pay their taxes on time,
and a fourth that paying one’s taxes is an important component of the democratic
contract. It is important to stress, however, that the impact of any nudge on behavior
is conditional on the content of the message, its fiscal context, and affected taxpayers.
Our results are for Philadelphia, given its current levels of penalties, the current
level of services provided by the City, and the preferences of its tardy taxpayers.
Tax nudges in cities with lower penalties, better services, or more civically minded
taxpayers might induce different behavioral responses. That said, the similarity of
our results, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to those of Castro and Scartascini
2015 for the property tax payments in Junin, Argentina is reassuring.
Third, the marginal impacts on city revenues of our strategies were quantitatively
significant. A simple reminder letter earned the City $28 more in additional revenues
for each additional dollar of administrative cost. A reminder coupled with our most
effective messages - the tax lien and sheriff letters - earned the City $65 more in
extra revenues for each dollar expended. This very high marginal revenue to cost
ratio strongly suggests that well targeted nudges should be part of any City’s revenue
collection strategy; see Keen and Slemrod 2016.
The conclusions of the second chapter are much less stark. The concept of an
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actively engaged classroom is one which appeals on some level to many math educators
with whom we have spoken. And in fact many students have expressed a strong
preference for the approach to tackling new material in mathematics that we analyzed
in Chapter Two. Conversely, however, many students voiced their disdain for the
active classroom and much preferred the traditional lecture format, which in some
ways offers more flexibility. It should come as no surprise that the actively taught
math classroom is not a silver bullet for bringing struggling students to mathematical
enlightenment.
We have, however, given evidence to help confirm the active classroom’s place in
the versatile educator’s toolbelt. In fact, it so happened that one of the “traditional”
instructors (who has indeed is known pushing the bounds of what “traditional” means
and was one of the early adopters of posting their recorded lectures for their students)
decided to “activate” their lecture hall several times, segueing from a standard lecture
to mid-sized groupwork mid-session; and their TAs were seen to run their recitation
sessions in the “active” groupwork format.
In the end, the students performed slightly (though not significantly) worse on the
course final exam, but even this taken alone would not amount to a condemnation
of the utility of the active approach – after all, the more fundamental outcome of
interest has not yet emerged, which is the ultimate persistence rates of active-assigned
students in STEM fields.
Chapter One, too, came to less-than-monumental conclusions. That salary in-
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centives appear to play such a limited role in driving teacher churn is bound at first
glance to be a disappointment for policymakers. The most powerful predictors of
turnover in educators in Wisconsin are all basically beyond the control of administra-
tors, who have no readily-manipulated direct lever for assigning students to schools60.
HKR found school quality (as measured by average standardized test performance)
to be of key importance for attracting/retaining teachers, but we found no evidence
that student proficiency (as measured by attainment levels on standardized tests) is
a factor in the turnover decision for Wisconsin teachers. Regardless, manipulating
school performance is famously difficult61, and is in fact the original goal administra-
tors often have in mind when they turn to labor market policies in the first place, so
that telling administrators they can improve teacher retention by improving student
performance amounts essentially to circular reasoning.
The upside is that this chapter is far from settling the debate about welfare-
maximizing teacher turnover policies. Limitations in our data prevent us from asso-
ciating to teachers anything but crude measures of their productivity; measures such
as experience, certification, and race are famously poor predictors of teacher quality
60There is evidence (e.g., Richards 2014) that catchment area manipulation (educational gerry-
mandering) is being used by some schools to select their student populations, but the equilibrium
outcome of the strategic interactions of districts competing for the most “desirable” students is far
from clear.
61See, for example, the widespread cheating scandals on standardized tests by teachers in Chicago
(Jacob and Levitt 2003), Atlanta, and Philadelphia as an example of the lengths professionals feel
they need to go to effect change in testing outcomes.
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measures such as value-added. We are thus unable to provide any input to the ques-
tion of whether high-quality teachers have patterns of mobility which resemble that
of the teaching population as a whole, or whether heterogeneity in their preferences
can be used to devise appropriate policies.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2:
Longitudinal Teacher Panel from
Unlinked Cross-Sectional Cuts
DPI WISEstaff data does not include a longitudinal identifier for teachers, so we re-
sorted to an alternative approach to matching teachers from year to year. The essence
of this algorithm relies on the inclusion of four fields in the DPI data – first name,
last name, nee (former last name) and birth year. By matching teacher using
these identifiers, it is possible to construct with high accuracy a panel of teachers
from simple teacher cross-sections62.
62The code for this process was done using R and especially helped by the data.table pack-
age (Dowle and Srinivasan 2017). The code to reproduce this entire project can be found at
https://github.com/MichaelChirico/wisconsin_teachers. The script for the algorithm is
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Step 0: Pre-Processing
Prior to beginning the matching process, a number of steps are taken to improve the
quality of the raw data. The first is to incorporate as many of the errata mentioned
in Public Instruction (2017b) as possible. All name variables are then converted to
lower case, after which we extract maiden names (identified for those missing a DPI-
supplied entry in nee as the part of the last name field that appears in between
parentheses or surrounding a hyphen or forward slash). Generally, it appears the
maiden name comes in the data before the hyphen, but we create the nee2 field to
identify potential matches to the post-hyphen name as well. A search was done of the
data for irregular characters (punctuation or numbers) which allowed several obvious
typos to be resolved (e.g., l0is a dewey was easy to resolve as being lois a dewey),
and this is implemented next.
We then create a “clean” version of the name fields which strips away all whites-
pace, initials (lone letters), and punctuation. At this stage, all observations which
identically match another in the same year from the viewpoint of the algorithm –
namely, those that match exactly another observation on the cleaned first and last
names and year of birth – are removed from the data since it would be impossible to
tell such teachers apart. A more ambitious treatment would attempt to use other cues
found in the duplicated records (ethnicity, subject/position cues, etc.) to separate
teacher match and clean.R. The README file gives steps for full reproduction, including retriev-
ing the raw data.
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such teachers, but the marginal cost of doing so was found to exceed the potential
benefit considerably for the exercise at hand (recall that only 0.7% of total observa-
tions are lost in this fashion). Finally, teachers in the first year of data (1994-95) are
assigned an ID starting from 1 using the within-year identifier provided by DPI.
Steps 1-21: Matching
The algorithm proceeds by iterating over years of the data. In each year Y , matches
are found serially by progressively adjusting the criteria for considering two observa-
tions to be from the same teacher as follows:
1. Match anyone who stayed in the same school – i.e., match any teacher found in
a year Y ′ < Y with the same first name, last name, and birth year at the
same district and school.
2. Find within-district switchers – those who match on all but the school field
from Step 1.
3. Find out-of-district switchers – those who match on all but the district field
from Step 2.
4. Find teachers that appear to have been married, but have not moved – their
nee field in Y is matched to the last name fields in Y ′ < Y , but otherwise the
fields from Step 1 are all matched. We create a flag for teachers matched in this
fashion called married.
5. Repeat Step 2 for those who appear to have married.
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6. Repeat Step 3 for those who appear to have married. 7-9. Repeat Steps 4-6
using the nee2 field instead of nee. 10-18. Repeat Steps 1-9 using the “cleaned”
version of the first name field that had non-alphabetic characters removed,
first name clean. We create a flag for teachers matched in this fashion called
mismatch inits.
7. Match individuals in the same school assigned to the same position (identified
in position code) but with different years of birth to overcome potential noise
in year of birth (most commonly, the year of birth is missing in some years).
We create a flag for teachers matched in this fashion called mismatch yob.
8. Match individuals in the same district assigned to the same position but with
different years of birth. We do not extend this logic to find district switchers
since the potential for erroneous match assignment in such a case is too great,
and we neglect to extend the algorithm to use other cues from the data to
facilitate matching in such cases.
9. Assign new IDs to all teachers in Y not matched in the first 20 steps, incre-
menting from the highest ID recorded thus far.
To help ensure we are matching to the most important observation of each teacher,
matching is always done to a teacher’s highest-FTE observation within a year (par-
ticularly important for Steps 19-20). Further, it is sometimes the case that a given
tuple of search keys matches more than one teacher in the prior data; if so, these rows
are simply ignored for that step and such a teacher will go unmatched unless they
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are uniquely pinned down in a subsequent step.
# Teachers Matched by Step
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Figure A.1: Frequency of Matching by Step
Figure A.1 Shows that teachers are most commonly matched in the first three
steps, meaning data fidelity issues are not per se devastating. The real benefits of
the algorithm are in the subsequent steps, as a result of which an additional 33,538
teachers are matched than would have been if only the original first and last name
fields as found in the raw data were used.
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Step 22: Post-Processing
The panels implied by the matched IDs created by the algorithm still have a substan-
tial amount of data quality issues which we can only address once teachers’ multiple
observations are associated, mainly having to do with instability in certain observable
characteristics which should be constant over time. First, we cascade forward maiden
names (if a teacher has non-missing nee in a period Y and it becomes missing in
Y ′ > Y , we replace it in Y ′ with its value in Y ); the same is done for the certification
field, highest degree (just as a teacher cannot erase marriage from their past, so
can they not make a degree disappear).
Next, we correct instability in the ethnicity (and gender) fields when possible
according to three steps: 1) it is sometimes missing, in which case we simply over-
write it with the other values found for that teacher; 2) at least 70% of a teacher’s
observations use the same ethnicity (or gender); or 3) there are at least five people
that share a last name with an ethnicity-ambiguous teacher, at least 70% of whom
have one ethnicity (or gender), the idea being that names like Xu or Gutierrez are
strongly associated with a particular ethnicity. This type of correction is uncommon
enough not to warrant an appeal to a more sophisticated approach commonly found
in natural language processing applications, e.g. training a classifier such as a random
forest (Breiman 2001) to predict ethnicity as accurately as possible.
Lastly, we synergize the year of birth field for those matched in Steps 19 or 20
by assigning the one that appears most frequently for each teacher; in the case of
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ties, we use a regression-to-the-mean-type logic and assign the year which brings the
teacher closer to the median age observed in the data. More data-driven approaches
(conditioning the target median on the teacher’s employer, position, year in the data,
or using social security data to determine the maximum-likelihood year of birth for
a given first name, etc.) were again eschewed for expediency.
Validity Check: file number
Starting in the 2011-12 release, the DPI data begins to consistently record a field
called file number for teachers which generally acts as a time-consistent ID (from
verbiage gleaned from Public Instruction 2017b, it appears this corresponds to a
teaching license number). We looked for instances of multiple file numbers and are
content that the algorithm is performing well – only 78 teacher IDs were found to
be associated with more than one file number, with almost all of them having been
matched on Steps 1 - 3 (what should be the highest-accuracy steps). Given a number
of apparent transcription mistakes (i.e., file number differing by one digit in some
years) and that the file number does appear to change on occasion, even these 78
could be an overstatement of the number of incorrectly matched individuals.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4:
Additional Figures and Tables
The appendix contains Tables A2 and A1 which summarizes additional balance tests
and robustness analyses using all owners (including multiple property owners).Tables
A3 and A4 report estimates based on Logit models for unary owners and unary plus
multiple owners.
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Table A1: Robustness Analysis: Relative to Reminder (All Owners)
Ever Paid Paid in Full
One Month Three Months One Month Three Months
Reminder 34.9 56.5 23.9 41.8
Lien 4.8∗∗∗ 4.7∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Sheriff 3.4∗∗∗ 4.6∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗ 3.6∗∗∗
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Neighborhood −1.0 −0.8 −1.2 −0.4
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Community −0.4 −1.4 −0.6 −0.2
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Peer 0.3 −0.8 0.4 0.8
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Duty −1.3 −0.2 −1.0 −0.8
(1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Num. obs. 19333 19333 19333 19333
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Reminder values in levels; remaining figures relative to this
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Table A3: Short-Term Logistic Model Estimates (Unary Owners)
Ever Paid Paid in Full
One Month Three Months One Month Three Months
Holdout −0.8 0.1 −1.2 −0.4
Reminder 0.2∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗ 0.1∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Lien 0.4∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Sheriff 0.3∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Neighborhood 0.1 0.1∗ −0.0 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Community 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗ 0.1 0.1∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Peer 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.1 0.1∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Duty 0.1∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.0 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
AIC 24493.1 26068.9 21605.6 26093.5
BIC 24556.0 26131.7 21668.4 26156.3
Log Likelihood -12238.6 -13026.4 -10794.8 -13038.7
Deviance 24477.1 26052.9 21589.6 26077.5
Num. obs. 19028 19028 19028 19028
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Holdout values in levels; remaining figures relative to this
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Table A4: Logit Estimates Including Multiple Owners
All Owners Unary Owners
One Month Three Months One Month Three Months
Lien 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Sheriff 0.15∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Neighborhood −0.05 −0.03 −0.09 −0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Community −0.02 −0.06 0.00 −0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Peer 0.01 −0.03 0.01 −0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Duty −0.06 −0.01 −0.06 −0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
AIC 25179.24 26349.91 21922.44 23174.00
BIC 25234.33 26405.00 21976.61 23228.16
Log Likelihood -12582.62 -13167.95 -10954.22 -11580.00
Deviance 25165.24 26335.91 21908.44 23160.00
Num. obs. 19333 19333 16940 16940
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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